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New Integrated Long-Term Glimpse of RC4

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Abstract. RC4, which was designed by Ron Rivest in 1987, is widely used in various applications such as SSL/TLS, WEP, WPA, etc. In 1996, Jenkins discovered correlations between one output keystream and a state location, known as Glimpse Theorem. In 2013, Maitra and Sen Gupta proved Glimpse Theorem and showed correlations between two consecutive output keystreams and a state location, called long-term Glimpse. In this paper, we show a new long-term Glimpse and integrate both the new and the previous long-term Glimpse into a whole.

Keywords: RC4, correlation, long-term Glimpse

1 Introduction

RC4, which was designed by Ron Rivest in 1987, is widely used in various applications such as Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS), Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-fi Protected Access (WPA), etc. Due to its popularity and simplicity, RC4 has become a hot cryptanalysis target since its specification was made public on the internet in 1994. For example, typical attacks on RC4 are distinguishing attack [3, 4, 10], state recovery attack [1, 6, 9] and key recovery attack [2, 8, 11].

In 1996, Jenkins discovered correlations between one output keystream and a state location, which is known as Glimpse Theorem [5]. These correlations have biases with the probability about $\frac{2}{N}$ higher than that of random association $\frac{1}{N}$ using the knowledge of one output keystream. In 2013, Maitra and Sen Gupta presented the complete proof of Glimpse Theorem and showed $S_r[r+1] = N-1$ occurs with the probability about $\frac{2}{N}$ when two consecutive output keystreams Z_r and Z_{r+1} satisfies $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$, where $S_r[r+1]$ is the r+1-th location of the state array in the r-th round as usual. They also showed the probability of $S_r[r+1] = N - 1$ is further increased to about $\frac{3}{N}$ when $Z_{r+1} = r + 2$ as well as $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$ occurs. Here, we call correlation with a probability significantly higher or lower than $\frac{1}{N}$ (the probability of random association) positive bias or negative bias, respectively. Then, their results of $S_r[r+1] = N - 1$ with the probability about $\frac{2}{N}$ correspond to cases with positive biases. Note that Theorem 2 implicitly means that there exists a value of $S_r[r+1]$ with negative bias since $S_r[r+1]$ varies in [0, N-1] when $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$ has happened. We often assume uniform randomness of other certain events to prove bias of a certain event.

Therefore, it is important to prove the existence of a value with negative bias explicitly. We also call such a case with negative bias to *dual case* of a positive bias.

In this paper, we first show a dual case of $S_r[r+1] = N-1$, that is $S_r[r+1] = 0$, occurs with the probability about $\frac{1}{N^2}$ when $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$, which will be shown as Theorem 4. Then, Theorem 5 will give each probability of $S_r[r+1] = 0$ when $Z_{r+1} = r + x$ ($\forall x \in [0, N-1]$) as well as $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$ occurs. Furthermore, during our careful observation of the dual case, we also find a new positive bias on $S_r[r+1]$, which will be shown in Theorem 6. Our results show that, giving two consecutive keystreams Z_r and Z_{r+1} satisfying with $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$ and $Z_{r+1} = r + 1 + x$ ($x \in [2, N-1]$), the probability of $S_r[r+1] = N - x$ is about $\frac{2}{N}$, which is significantly higher than random association $\frac{1}{N}$. Note that the previous results are limited to a value of $S_r[r+1] = N - 1$, but our results varies $S_r[r+1] \in [0, N-2]$. Furthermore, both our new and the previous results are integrated into long-term Glimpse of $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$ in Theorem 7.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes notation and RC4 algorithms. Section 3 presents the previous works on Glimpse Theorem [5] and long-term Glimpse [7]. Section 4 first discusses positive and negative biases, and shows Theorems 4 to 7. Section 5 demonstrates experimental simulations. Section 6 concludes this paper.

2 Preliminary

The following notation is used in this paper.

- K, l: secret key, the length of secret key (bytes)
 - r : number of rounds
 - N: number of arrays in state (typically N = 256)
- S_r^K or S_r : state of KSA or PRGA after the swap in the r-th round
 - i_r, j_r : indices of S_r for the *r*-th round
 - Z_r : one output keystream for the *r*-th round
 - t_r : index of Z_r

RC4 consists of two algorithms: Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA). KSA generates the state S_N^K from a secret key K of l bytes as described in Algorithm 1. Then, the final state S_N^K in KSA becomes the input of PRGA as S_0 . Once the state S_0 is computed, PRGA generates one output keystream Z_r of bytes as described in Algorithm 2. The output keystream Z_r will be XORed with a plaintext to generate a ciphertext.

Algorithm 1 KSA	Algorithm 2 PRGA		
1: for $i = 0$ to $N - 1$ do	1: $r \leftarrow 0, i_0 \leftarrow 0, j_0 \leftarrow 0$		
2: $S_0^K[i] \leftarrow i$	2: loop		
3: end for	3: $r \leftarrow r+1, i_r \leftarrow i_{r-1}+1$		
4: $j \leftarrow 0$	$4: j_r \leftarrow j_{r-1} + S_{r-1}[i_r]$		
5: for $i = 0$ to $N - 1$ do	5: $Swap(S_{r-1}[i_r], S_{r-1}[j_r])$		
$6: j \leftarrow j + S_i^K[i] + K[i \mod l]$	$6: t_r \leftarrow S_r[i_r] + S_r[j_r]$		
7: $\operatorname{Swap}(S_i^K[i], S_i^K[j])$	7: Output: $Z_r \leftarrow S_r[t_r]$		
8: end for	8: end loop		

In this paper, we focus on PRGA and investigate correlations between two consecutive output keystreams and a state location. The probability of one location by random association is $\frac{1}{N}$ and uniform randomness of the RC4 stream cipher is assumed if there are no significant biases.

3 Previous works

In 1996, Jenkins discovered correlations between one output keystream and a state location [5], which is proved as Glimpse Theorem in [7]. Glimpse Theorem is given as follows.

Theorem 1. [7] After the r-th round of PRGA for $r \ge 1$, we have

 $\Pr(S_r[j_r] = i_r - Z_r) = \Pr(S_r[i_r] = j_r - Z_r) \approx \frac{2}{N}.$

In 2013, Maitra and Sen Gupta discovered other correlations between two consecutive output keystreams and the r + 1-th location of the state array in the r-th round, which is called long-term Glimpse [7]. Long-term Glimpse is given as follows. Note that Theorem 3 is a special case of Theorem 2.

Theorem 2. [7] After the r-th round of PRGA for $r \ge 1$, we have

$$r(S_r[r+1] = N - 1 | Z_{r+1} = Z_r) \approx \frac{2}{N}.$$

Theorem 3. [7] After the r-th round of PRGA for $r \ge 1$, we have

 $\Pr(S_r[r+1] = N - 1 | Z_{r+1} = Z_r \land Z_{r+1} = r+2) \approx \frac{3}{N}.$

4 New results on long-term Glimpse

4.1 Observation

Let us investigate the previous results (Theorems 2 and 3) in detail. Here, we call correlation with a probability significantly higher or lower than $\frac{1}{N}$ (the probability of random association) to *positive bias* or *negative bias*, respectively. Theorems 2 and 3 give cases with positive biases. Then, Theorem 2 implicitly means that there exists a value of $S_r[r+1]$ with negative bias since $S_r[r+1]$ varies in [0, N-1] even when $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$ has happened. We often assume uniform randomness of other certain events to prove bias of a certain event. Therefore, it is important to prove the existence of a value in $S_r[r+1]$ with negative bias explicitly. We also call such a case with negative bias a *dual case* of a positive bias.

One of our motivation is to find a dual case of Theorem 2, which will be shown as Theorem 4. Then, we will also prove a special case of Theorem 4 in the same way as Theorem 3 to Theorem 2, which will be shown as Theorem 5. Furthermore, during our careful observation of the dual case, we also find a new positive bias on $S_r[r+1]$, which will be shown in Theorem 6. Our new results can integrate long-term Glimpse when $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$. The previous results are limited to the case of $S_r[r+1] = N - 1$ when $Z_{r+1} = Z_r$. Our results are not limited to $S_r[r+1] = N - 1$ but varies $S_r[r+1] \in [0, N-2]$. Finally, both results can be integrated in Theorem 7.

4.2 New negative biases

First, Theorem 4 shows a dual case of Theorem 2 as follows.

Theorem 4. After the r-th round of PRGA for $r \ge 1$, we have

$$\Pr(S_r[r+1] = 0 | Z_{r+1} = Z_r) \approx \frac{2}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right).$$

Proof. We define main events as follows:

$$A := (S_r[r+1] = 0), B := (Z_{r+1} = Z_r).$$

We first compute Pr(B|A), and apply Bayes' theorem to prove the claim. Assuming that event A happened, we get

$$j_{r+1} = j_r + S_r[i_{r+1}] = j_r + S_r[r+1] = j_r.$$

Then, $\Pr(B|A)$ is computed in three paths: $j_r = r$ (Path 1), $j_r = r + 1$ (Path 2) and $j_r \neq r, r + 1$ (Path 3). These paths include all events in order to compute $\Pr(B|A)$. Let $X = S_r[r]$ and $Y = S_r[j_r]$.

- **Path 1.** Fig. 1 shows a state transition diagram in Path 1. First, we prove $t_r \neq t_{r+1}$. After the *r*-th round, $t_r = 2X$ holds since $i_r = j_r = r$. In the next round, $t_{r+1} = X$ holds since $j_{r+1} = j_r = r$ and $i_{r+1} = r+1$. Thus, we get $t_r \neq t_{r+1}$ with probability 1 since $X \neq 0$. Then, if event *B* occurs, t_{r+1} must be swapped from t_r . This is why Pr(Path 1) = Pr($B|A \land j_r = r$) is computed in two subpaths: $i_r = 1 \land t_{r+1} = 1$ (Path 1-1) and $i_r = 254 \land t_{r+1} = 255$ (Path 1-2).
 - **Path 1-1.** Fig. 2 shows a state transition diagram in Path 1-1. Then, we get event *B* since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[1] = 0$ and $Z_r = S_r[2] = 0$. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 1-1 as follows.

$$Pr(Path 1-1) = Pr(Path 1 \land i_r = 1 \land t_{r+1} = 1) = 1.$$

Path 1-2. Fig. 3 shows a state transition diagram in Path 1-2. Then, we get event B since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[255] = 255$ and $Z_r = S_r[254] = 255$. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 1-2 as follows.

$$\Pr(\text{Path 1-2}) = \Pr(\text{Path 1} \land i_r = 254 \land t_{r+1} = 255) = 1.$$

Therefore, the probability of Path 1 is computed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{Path 1}) &= \Pr(\text{Path 1-1}) \cdot \Pr(i_r = 1 \land t_{r+1} = 1) \\ &+ \Pr(\text{Path 1-2}) \cdot \Pr(i_r = 254 \land t_{r+1} = 255) \\ &\approx 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) + 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) = \frac{2}{N^2}. \end{aligned}$$



Fig. 3. Path 1-2

Path 2. Fig. 4 shows a state transition diagram in Path 2. We get $t_r \neq t_{r+1}$ in the same way as Path 1. Then, event *B* never occurs because t_{r+1} can not be swapped from t_r . Therefore, the probability of Path 2 is computed as follows.

$$\Pr(\text{Path } 2) = \Pr(B|A \land j_r = r+1) = 0.$$

- **Path 3.** Fig. 5 shows a state transition diagram in Path 3. We get $t_r \neq t_{r+1}$ in the same way as Path 1. Then, if event *B* occurs, t_{r+1} must be swapped from t_r . This is why Pr(Path 3) = Pr($B|A \land j_r \neq r, r+1$) is computed in two subpaths: $t_r = j_r \land t_{r+1} = r+1$ (Path 3-1) and $t_r = r+1 \land t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}$ (Path 3-2).
 - **Path 3-1.** Fig. 6 shows a state transition diagram in Path 3-1. Then, we get event B since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[r+1] = r+1$ and $Z_r = S_r[j_r] = r+1$. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 3-1 as follows.

$$Pr(Path 3-1) = Pr(Path 3 \land t_r = j_r \land t_{r+1} = r+1) = 1.$$

Path 3-2. Fig. 7 shows a state transition diagram in Path 3-2. Then, we get event B since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[j_{r+1}] = 0$ and $Z_r = S_r[r+1] = 0$. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 3-2 as follows.

$$\Pr(\text{Path 3-2}) = \Pr(\text{Path 3} \land t_r = r + 1 \land t_{r+1} = j_r) = 1.$$

Therefore, the probability of Path 3 is computed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{Path 3}) &= \Pr(\text{Path 3-1}) \cdot \Pr(t_r = j_r \wedge t_{r+1} = r+1) \\ &+ \Pr(\text{Path 3-2}) \cdot \Pr(t_r = r+1 \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) \\ &\approx 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) + 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) = \frac{2}{N^2}. \end{aligned}$$

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Fig. 6. Path 3-1



From these results, $\Pr(B|A)$ is computed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(B|A) &= \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 1) \cdot \Pr(j_r = r) + \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 2) \cdot \Pr(j_r = r+1) \\ &+ \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 3) \cdot \Pr(j_r \neq r, r+1) \\ &\approx \frac{2}{N^2} \cdot \frac{1}{N} + 0 \cdot \frac{1}{N} + \frac{2}{N^2} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) = \frac{2}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right). \end{aligned}$$

 $\Pr(A|B)$ is computed as follows by applying Bayes' theorem since events A and B occur with the probability of random association $\frac{1}{N}$.

$$\Pr(A|B) = \frac{\Pr(B|A) \cdot \Pr(A)}{\Pr(B)} \approx \frac{\frac{2}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N}}{\frac{1}{N}} = \frac{2}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right). \qquad \Box$$

Next, Theorem 5 shows a special case of Theorem 4 as follows.

Theorem 5. After the r-th round of PRGA for $r \ge 1$ and $\forall x \in [0, N-1]$, we have

$$\Pr(S_r[r+1] = 0 | Z_{r+1} = Z_r \land Z_{r+1} = r+x) \approx \begin{cases} \frac{1}{N} \left(1 - \frac{2}{N^2}\right) & \text{if } x = 1\\ \frac{2}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) & \text{if } x = 255\\ \frac{1}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) & \text{if } x = N - r\\ (x \neq 1, 255). \end{cases}$$

Proof. We define main events as follows.

$$A := (S_r[r+1] = 0), B := (Z_{r+1} = Z_r), C := (Z_{r+1} = r + x).$$

 $\Pr(A|B \wedge C)$ is difficult to compute because events B and C are not independent. To avoid this problem, we define a new event $B' := (Z_r = r + x)$. Then, $\Pr(A|B \wedge C) = \Pr(A|B' \wedge C)$ since $B \wedge C$ and $B' \wedge C$ are the same event. $\Pr(A|B' \wedge C)$ is decomposed as follows by using Bayes' theorem:

$$\Pr(A|B' \wedge C) = \frac{\Pr(A \wedge B' \wedge C)}{\Pr(B' \wedge C)} = \frac{\Pr(C|B' \wedge A) \cdot \Pr(B'|A) \cdot \Pr(A)}{\Pr(B' \wedge C)}$$

We first compute $\Pr(C|B' \wedge A)$ in three paths: $j_r = r$ (Path 1), $j_r = r + 1$ (Path 2) and $j_r \neq r, r + 1$ (Path 3). These paths are the same as in Theorem 4, and thus the proof itself is similar to Theorem 4. Let $X = S_r[r]$ and $Y = S_r[j_r]$.

- **Path 1.** Fig. 1 shows a state transition diagram in Path 1. Note that $t_r \neq t_{r+1}$ from the discussion of Path 1 in Theorem 4, and that event C is limited to two subpaths: $i_r = 1$ for r + x = 0 (Path 1-1) and $t_{r+1} = 255$ for r + x = 255 (Path 1-2).
 - **Path 1-1.** Fig. 2 shows a state transition diagram in Path 1-1. Then, event C holds under event $B' \wedge A$ since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[1] = 0$ and $Z_r = S_r[2] = 0$. Note that $i_r = 1$ and r + x = 0 hold if and only if x = 255. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 1-1 as follows.

$$\Pr(\text{Path 1-1}) = \Pr(\text{Path 1} \land i_r = 1) = 1 \text{ if } x = 255.$$

Path 1-2. Fig. 3 shows a state transition diagram in Path 1-2. Then, event C holds under event $B' \wedge A$ since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[255] = 255$ and $Z_r = S_r[254] = 255$. Note that $i_r = 254$ (see Fig. 3) and r + x = 255 hold if and only if x = 1. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 1-2 as follows.

$$\Pr(\text{Path 1-2}) = \Pr(\text{Path 1} \land t_{r+1} = 255) = 1 \text{ if } x = 1.$$

Therefore, the probability of Path 1 is computed as follows.

$$\Pr(\text{Path 1}) = \begin{cases} \Pr(\text{Path 1-1}) \cdot \Pr(i_r = 1) \approx \frac{1}{N} & \text{if } x = 255 \\ \Pr(\text{Path 1-2}) \cdot \Pr(t_{r+1} = 255) \approx \frac{1}{N} & \text{if } x = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Path 2. Event C never occurs in Path 2 from the discussion of Path 2 in Theorem 4. Therefore, the probability of Path 2 is computed as follows.

$$\Pr(\text{Path } 2) = \Pr(C|B' \land A \land j_r = r+1) = 0.$$

Path 3. Fig. 5 shows a state transition diagram in Path 3. Note that $t_r \neq t_{r+1}$ from the discussion of Path 3 in Theorem 4, and that event C is limited to two subpaths: $t_{r+1} = r+1$ for x = 1 (Path 3-1) and $t_r = r+1 \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}$ for r + x = 0 (Path 3-2).

 \Pr

Path 3-1. Fig. 6 shows a state transition diagram in Path 3-1. Then, event C holds under event $B' \wedge A$ since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[r+1] = r+1$ and $Z_r = S_r[j_r] = r+1$. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 3-1 as follows.

$$Pr(Path 3-1) = Pr(Path 3 \land t_{r+1} = r+1) = 1$$
 if $x = 1$.

Path 3-2. Fig. 7 shows a state transition diagram in Path 3-2. Then, event C holds under event $B' \wedge A$ since $Z_{r+1} = S_{r+1}[j_{r+1}] = 0$ and $Z_r = S_r[r+1] = 0$. Note that r + x = 0 ($\forall r \in [0, N-1]$) means x = N - r. Thus, we can compute the probability of Path 3-2 as follows.

 $\Pr(\text{Path 3-2}) = \Pr(\text{Path 3} \land t_r = r + 1 \land t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) = 1.$

Therefore, the probability of Path 3 is computed as follows.

$$(\text{Path 3}) = \Pr(\text{Path 3-1}) \cdot \Pr(t_{r+1} = r+1) \\ + \Pr(\text{Path 3-2}) \cdot \Pr(t_r = r+1 \land t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) \\ \approx \begin{cases} 1 \cdot \frac{1}{N} + 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) = \frac{1}{N} \left(1 + \frac{1}{N}\right) & \text{if } x = 1 \\ 0 \cdot \frac{1}{N} + 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) = \frac{1}{N^2} & \text{if } x = N - r \ (x \neq 1) \end{cases}$$

From these results, $\Pr(C|B' \wedge A)$ is computed as follows.

$$\Pr(C|B' \land A) = \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 1) \cdot \Pr(j_r = r) + \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 2) \cdot \Pr(j_r = r + 1) \\ + \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 3) \cdot \Pr(j_r \neq r, r + 1) \\ \approx \begin{cases} \frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \cdot \left(1 + \frac{1}{N}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) = \frac{1}{N} \left(1 - \frac{2}{N^2}\right) & \text{if } x = 1 \\ \frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) = \frac{2}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) & \text{if } x = 255 \\ 0 \cdot \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) = \frac{1}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) & \text{if } x = N - r \\ (x \neq 1, 255). \end{cases}$$

 $\Pr(A|B \wedge C)$ is computed as follows by applying Bayes' theorem since events A, B', C and B'|A occur with the probability of random association $\frac{1}{N}$.

$$\Pr(A|B \wedge C) = \frac{\Pr(C|B' \wedge A) \cdot \Pr(B'|A) \cdot \Pr(A)}{\Pr(B' \wedge C)} \approx \frac{\Pr(C|B' \wedge A) \cdot \frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}}{\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}}$$
$$= \Pr(C|B' \wedge A) \approx \begin{cases} \frac{1}{N} \left(1 - \frac{2}{N^2}\right) & \text{if } x = 1\\ \frac{2}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) & \text{if } x = 255 \\ \frac{1}{N^2} \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) & \text{if } x = N - r \ (x \neq 1, 255). \end{cases}$$

4.3 New positive biases and their integration

Theorem 6 shows a new positive bias on $S_r[r+1]$ as follows.

Theorem 6. After the r-th round of PRGA for $r \ge 1$ and $\forall x \in [2, N-1]$, we have

$$\Pr(S_r[r+1] = N - x | Z_{r+1} = Z_r \land Z_{r+1} = r+1+x) \approx \frac{2}{N} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2}\right).$$

Proof. We define main events as follows.

$$A := (S_r[r+1] = N - x), B := (Z_{r+1} = Z_r),$$

$$B' := (Z_r = r + 1 + x), C := (Z_{r+1} = r + 1 + x).$$

The proof itself is similar to Theorem 5. We first compute $\Pr(C|B' \wedge A)$ in three paths: $j_r = r$ (Path 1), $j_r = r + 1$ (Path 2) and $j_r \neq r, r + 1$ (Path 3). Let $X = S_r[r], Y = S_r[j_r]$ and $W = S_r[j_{r+1}]$.

- **Path 1.** Both t_r and t_{r+1} are independent since we get $t_r = 2X$ and $t_{r+1} = N x + W$. Then, event C is limited to three subpaths: $t_{r+1} = r + 1$ (Path 1-1), $N x = r + 1 + x \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}$ (Path 1-2) and $t_{r+1} = t_r$ except when t_r equals either r + 1 or j_{r+1} (Path 1-3). We can compute the probability of each subpath as follows.
 - $\Pr(\text{Path 1-1}) = \Pr(\text{Path 1} \land t_{r+1} = r+1) = 1,$
 - $\Pr(\text{Path 1-2}) = \Pr(\text{Path 1} \land N x = r + 1 + x \land t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) = 1,$ $\Pr(\text{Path 1-3}) = \Pr(\text{Path 1} \land t_{r+1} = t_r) = 1 - \frac{2}{N}.$
 - Therefore, the probability of Path 1 is computed as follows.

 $\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{Path 1}) &= \Pr(\text{Path 1-1}) \cdot \Pr(t_{r+1} = r+1) \\ &+ \Pr(\text{Path 1-2}) \cdot \Pr(N - x = r+1 + x \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) \\ &+ \Pr(\text{Path 1-3}) \cdot \Pr(t_{r+1} = t_r) \\ &\approx 1 \cdot \frac{1}{N} + 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) + \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} = \frac{1}{N} \left(2 - \frac{1}{N}\right). \end{aligned}$

Path 2. We get $t_r \neq t_{r+1}$ since $t_r = N - x + X$, $t_{r+1} = N - x + W$ and $X \neq W$. Then, event *C* is limited to two subpaths: $t_{r+1} = r + 1$ (Path 2-1) and $N - x = r + 1 + x \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}$ (Path 2-2). We can compute the probability of each subpath as follows.

$$Pr(Path 2-1) = Pr(Path 2 \land t_{r+1} = r+1) = 1,$$

 $\Pr(\text{Path 2-2}) = \Pr(\text{Path } 2 \land N - x = r + 1 + x \land t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) = 1.$

Therefore, the probability of Path 2 is computed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{Path 2}) &= \Pr(\text{Path 2-1}) \cdot \Pr(t_{r+1} = r+1) \\ &+ \Pr(\text{Path 2-2}) \cdot \Pr(N - x = r+1 + x \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) \\ &\approx 1 \cdot \frac{1}{N} + 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) = \frac{1}{N} \left(1 + \frac{1}{N}\right). \end{aligned}$$

 $\Pr(C|B' \land$

Path 3. Both t_r and t_{r+1} are independent since we get $t_r = X + Y$ and $t_{r+1} = N - x + W$. Then, event *C* is limited to three subpaths: $t_{r+1} = r + 1$ (Path 3-1), $N - x = r + 1 + x \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}$ (Path 3-2) and $t_{r+1} = t_r$ except when t_r equals either r + 1 or j_{r+1} (Path 3-3). We can compute the probability of each subpath as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr(\text{Path 3-1}) = \Pr(\text{Path 3} \land t_{r+1} = r+1) = 1, \\ &\Pr(\text{Path 3-2}) = \Pr(\text{Path 3} \land N - x = r+1 + x \land t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) = 1, \\ &\Pr(\text{Path 3-3}) = \Pr(\text{Path 3} \land t_{r+1} = t_r) = 1 - \frac{2}{N}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the probability of Path 3 is computed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{Path 3}) &= \Pr(\text{Path 3-1}) \cdot \Pr(t_{r+1} = r+1) \\ &+ \Pr(\text{Path 3-2}) \cdot \Pr(N - x = r+1 + x \wedge t_{r+1} = j_{r+1}) \\ &+ \Pr(\text{Path 3-3}) \cdot \Pr(t_{r+1} = t_r) \\ &\approx 1 \cdot \frac{1}{N} + 1 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N}\right) + \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} = \frac{1}{N} \left(2 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \end{aligned}$$

From these results, $\Pr(C|B' \wedge A)$ is computed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} A) &= \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 1) \cdot \Pr(j_r = r) + \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 2) \cdot \Pr(j_r = r+1) \\ &+ \Pr(\operatorname{Path} 3) \cdot \Pr(j_r \neq r, r+1) \\ &\approx \frac{1}{N} \left(2 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \left(1 + \frac{1}{N}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \left(2 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) \\ &= \frac{2}{N} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2}\right). \end{aligned}$$

As a result, $\Pr(A|B \wedge C)$ is computed as follows.

$$\Pr(A|B \wedge C) \approx \Pr(C|B' \wedge A) \approx \frac{2}{N} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2}\right).$$

Finally, we can integrate long-term Glimpse on $S_r[r+1]$ as Theorem 7. **Theorem 7.** After the r-th round of PRGA for $r \ge 1$ and $\forall x \in [0, N-1]$, we have

$$\Pr(S_r[r+1] = N - x | Z_{r+1} = Z_r \land Z_{r+1} = r + 1 + x) \\ \approx \begin{cases} \frac{1}{N} \left(1 - \frac{2}{N^2} \right) & \text{if } x = 0 \\ \frac{1}{N} \left(3 - \frac{6}{N} + \frac{2}{N^2} \right) & \text{if } x = 1^1 \\ \frac{2}{N} \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2} \right) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

¹ The probability of correlation when x = 1 can be precisely revised to $\frac{1}{N}(3 - \frac{6}{N} + \frac{2}{N^2})$ from [7] in the same way as our other cases of $x \neq 1$, whose precise proof will be given in the final paper.

5 Experimental results

In order to check the accuracy of biases shown in Theorems 4 to 6, the experiments are executed using 2^{24} randomly chosen keys of 16 bytes and 2^{24} output keystreams for each key, which mean $2^{48} (= N^6)$ trials of RC4. Note that $\mathcal{O}(N^3)$ trials are reported to be sufficient to identify the biases with reliable success probability since each correlation here is of about $\frac{1}{N}$ with respect to a base event of probability $\frac{1}{N}$. Our experimental environment is as follows: Linux machine with 2.6 GHz CPU, 3.8 GiB memory, gcc 4.6.3 compiler and C language. We also evaluate the percentage of relative error ϵ of experimental values compared with theoretical values:

 $\epsilon = \frac{|\text{experimental value} - \text{theoretical value}|}{\text{experimental value}} \times 100(\%).$

Results		Experimental value	Theoretical value	$\epsilon(\%)$
Theorem 4		0.000030522	0.000030398	0.406
Theorem 5	for $x = 1$	0.003922408	0.003906131	0.415
	for $x = 255$	0.000030683	0.000030398	0.929
	for $x = N - r \ (x \neq 1, 255)$	0.000015259	0.000015140	0.780
Theorem 6		0.007812333	0.007782102	0.387

Table 1. Cor	nparison betweer	a experimental	and	theoretical	values
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Table 1 shows experimental, theoretical values and the percentage of relative errors ϵ , which indicates ϵ is small enough in each case such as $\epsilon \leq 0.929$. Therefore, we have convinced that theoretical values closely reflects the experimental values.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown dual cases of the previous long-term Glimpse. We have also shown a new long-term Glimpse. We note that the previous long-term Glimpse is limited to $S_r[r+1] = N - 1$ but that our results varies $S_r[r+1] \in [0, N-2]$. As a result, these long-term Glimpse can be integrated to biases of $S_r[r+1] \in [0, N-1]$. These new integrated long-term Glimpse could contribute to the improvement of state recovery attack on RC4, which remains an open problem.

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