

Title	予期的後悔が道徳的意思決定に与える影響の道徳ジレンマ課題による分析
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Citation	
Issue Date	2024-03
Type	Thesis or Dissertation
Text version	author
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/10119/18943
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Abstract

What influences humans' decisions in moral decision-making situations? It is an everyday experience that the anticipation of regret influences decision-making. Moral judgments and moral decision-making have been studied by means of moral dilemma tasks. Moral dilemmas are scenarios in which two moral values are in conflict and one must choose or judge between a commission (action) that saves the many by harming the few or an omission (inaction) that sacrifices the many by refusing to harm the few. Both choices result in the loss of human lives. The commission is a decision that focuses on the number of people to be saved as consequences, while the omission is a decision that focuses on the moral norm that killing is not justified. Research on moral dilemma tasks has led to the Dual Process Theory of moral judgment (Greene, 2015), which proposes that human moral judgments are made based on whether or not emotion interferes with reason. However, despite the fact that anticipatory regret is everyday experienced as affecting moral decision-making, its effects are not assumed in the theory.

The purpose of this study is to clarify the influence of anticipatory regret on moral decision-making. Specifically, we test the following three hypotheses. Hypothesis A is that anticipatory regret increases inaction decisions. Hypothesis B is that anticipatory sadness does not affect moral decision making and is distinct from anticipatory regret. Hypothesis C is that the cognitive element prevails over the affective element in anticipatory regret.

To test these hypotheses, we examined the effect of anticipatory regret on moral decision-making by conducting a moral dilemma task in which anticipatory regret was induced. In addition, we examined the components of anticipatory regret using the Regret Element Scale as a post-event questionnaire. Participants were divided into three conditions: anticipatory regret ($N = 15$), anticipatory sadness ($N = 16$), and control ($N = 16$), and performed the moral dilemma tasks while inducing emotions in each condition. The results showed that the ratio of commission decision making in the anticipatory regret and anticipatory sadness conditions did not differ from that in the control condition, respectively. Thus, Hypothesis A was not verified, and Hypothesis B, that anticipatory regret is distinct from anticipatory sadness, was rejected. The results of the Regret Element Scale indicated that the cognitive element was comparable to the affective element, and Hypothesis C was not verified.

In conclusion, the results suggest that anticipatory regret influences both commission and omissions in moral decision-making. Therefore, we propose that when anticipatory regret is considered, moral decision making is a process in which reason works after the counterfactual anticipatory regret., which is opposite to the rational and emotional workings of the Dual Process Theory.