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On the Success Probability of χ^2 -attack on RC6

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Abstract. Knudsen and Meier applied the χ^2 -attack to RC6. The χ^2 -attack can be used for both distinguishing attacks and key recovery attacks. Up to the present, the success probability of key recovery attack in any χ^2 -attack has not been evaluated theoretically without any assumption of experimental results. In this paper, we discuss the success probability of key recovery attack in χ^2 -attack and give the theorem that evaluates the success probability of a key recovery attack without any assumption of experimental approximation, for the first time. We make sure the accuracy of our theorem by demonstrating it on both 4-round RC6 without post-whitening and 4-round RC6-8. We also evaluate the security of RC6 theoretically and show that a variant of the χ^2 -attack is faster than an exhaustive key search for the 192-bit-key and 256-bit-key RC6 with up to 16 rounds. As a result, we succeed in answering such an open question that a variant of the χ^2 -attack can be used to attack RC6 with 16 or more rounds.

Keywords : block cipher, RC6, χ^2 attack, statistical analysis

1 Introduction

The χ^2 -attack makes use of correlations between input (plaintext) and output (ciphertext) measured by the χ^2 -test. The χ^2 -attack was originally proposed by Vaudenay as an attack on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [14], and Handschuh *et al.* applied that to SEAL [4]. The χ^2 -attack is used for both distinguishing attacks and key recovery attacks. Distinguishing attacks have only to handle plaintexts in such a way that the χ^2 -value of a part of ciphertexts becomes significantly a high value. On the other hand, key recovery attacks have to rule out all wrong keys, and single out exactly a correct key by using the χ^2 -value. Therefore, key recovery attacks often require more work and memory than distinguishing attacks.

RC6 is a 128-bit block cipher and supports keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits [12]. RC6- $w/r/b$ means that four w -bit-word plaintexts are encrypted with r rounds by b -byte keys. In [3, 8], the χ^2 -attacks were applied to RC6. They focused on the fact that a specific rotation in RC6 causes the correlations between input and output, and estimated their key recovery attack directly from results of a distinguishing attack [8]. The χ^2 -attacks to a simplified variant of RC6 such as RC6 without pre-

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or post-whitening or RC6 without only post-whitening are further improved in [11] or [5], respectively. We may note that key recovery attacks in [11, 5] differ from that in [8]: The variance of χ^2 -value is taken into account to recover a key in [11, 5] but not in [8]. They also pointed out the significant difference between the distinguishing attack and the key recovery attack: The distinguishing attack succeeds if and only if it outputs high χ^2 -value, but the key recovery attack does not necessarily succeed even if it outputs high χ^2 -value. In fact, their key recovery attack can recover a correct key in the high probability with a rather lower χ^2 -value. This indicates that the security against the key recovery attack cannot be estimated directly from that against the distinguishing attack. Table 1 summarizes the previous results on RC6.

Table 1. Attacks on RC6

Attack	Target RC6	Rounds	#Texts
Linear Attack [1]	RC6	16	2^{119}
Multiple Linear Attack [15]	192-bit-key RC6	14^1	$2^{119.68}$
χ^2 Attack [8]	128-bit-key RC6	12	2^{94}
	192-bit-key RC6	14	2^{108}
	256-bit-key RC6	15	2^{119}
χ^2 Attack [11]	128-bit key RC6W ²	17	$2^{123.9}$
χ^2 Attack [5]	128-bit key RC6P ³	16	$2^{117.84}$
Our result	192-bit-key RC6	16	$2^{127.20}$
	256-bit-key RC6	16	$2^{127.20}$

- 1: A weak key of 18-round RC6 with 256-bit key can be recovered by $2^{126.936}$ plaintexts with the probability of about $1/2^{90}$.
- 2: RC6W means RC6 without pre- or post-whitening.
- 3: RC6P means RC6 without post-whitening.

Theoretical analysis on χ^2 -attack has been done by [16, 10]. In [16], the average of χ^2 -value based on the distinguishing attack [8] on RC6 is theoretically computed, which enables to compute the necessary number of plaintexts for the χ^2 -value with a certain level. As a result, the necessary number of plaintexts for distinguishing attacks can be estimated theoretically in each round. However, this cannot evaluate the success probability of key recovery attacks directly since there is the significant difference between the distinguishing attack and the key recovery attack as mentioned above. On the other hand, theoretical difference between a distinguishing attack and a key recovery attack on RC6 without post-whitening [5] has been discussed in [10]. They make use of the idea of the theoretical and experimental complexity analysis on the linear cryptanalysis [6, 13] to fit it in the theoretical and experimental complexity analysis on the χ^2 -attack. They also present the theorem to compute the success probability of key recovery attacks by using the results of distinguishing attack, and, thus, they can succeed to estimate the security against key recovery attack on RC6 with

rather less work and memory. However, their estimation requires experimental results of distinguishing attacks. Up to the present, the success probability of key recovery attack in χ^2 -attack has not been evaluated theoretically without any assumption of experimental results.

In this paper, we investigate the success probability of key recovery attack in χ^2 -attack, for the first time, and give the theorem that evaluates the success probability of a key recovery attack without any experimental result. First we deal with a key recovery attack on RC6 without post-whitening [5] and give the theorem that evaluates the success probability theoretically. We make sure the accuracy of our theorem by comparing our approximation with the experimental results [5]. With our theory, we also confirm that 16-round 128-bit-key RC6 without post-whitening can be broken, which reflects the experimental approximation [5]. Then we improve the key recovery attack to work on RC6 itself. The primitive extension to RC6 are shown in [5], but it does not seem to work. We give the theorem that evaluates the success probability of the key recovery attack on RC6 theoretically. We also demonstrate our theorem on 4-round RC6-8 and make sure the accuracy by comparing our approximation with the experimental results. With our theory, we confirm that 16-round 192-bit-key and 256-bit key RC6 can be broken. As a result, we can answer the open question of [8], that is, whether χ^2 -attack can be used to attack RC6 with 16 or more rounds.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the notation, RC6 algorithms, the χ^2 -test, and statistical facts used in this paper. Section 3 reviews the χ^2 -attack against RC6 without post-whitening and the theoretical relation between a distinguishing attack and a key recovery attack. Section 4 presents the theorem of success probability of key recovery attacks on RC6 without post-whitening and investigates the accuracy by comparing the approximations of success probability to 4-round RC6 without post-whitening with implemented results. Section 5 improves the key recovery algorithm on RC6 without post-whitening to that on RC6 and presents the theorem of success probability of the key recovery attacks on RC6. We investigate the accuracy by demonstrating the key recovery algorithm on RC6-8. We also discuss the applicable round of key recovery attack. A conclusion is given in Section 6.

2 Preliminary

We summarize the χ^2 -test, statistical facts, and RC6 algorithms[12], used in this paper.

2.1 Statistical Facts

We make use of the χ^2 -statistics [9] to distinguish a distribution with an unknown probability distribution \mathbf{p} from an expected distribution with a probability distribution π . Let $X = X_0, \dots, X_{n-1}$ be a sequence of $\forall X_i \in \{a_0, \dots, a_{m-1}\}$ with unknown probability distribution \mathbf{p} , and $N_{a_j}(X)$ be the number of X which

takes on the value a_j . The χ^2 -statistic of X which estimates the distance between the observed distribution and the expected distribution $\pi = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_m)$ is defined:

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \frac{(N(a_i) - n\pi_i)^2}{n\pi_i}. \quad (1)$$

After computing the χ^2 -statistic of X , we decide which hypothesis holds.

$$\begin{cases} H_0 : \mathbf{p} = \pi & (\text{null hypothesis}) \\ H_1 : \mathbf{p} \neq \pi & (\text{alternate hypothesis}) \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

The following Theorems 1 and 2 on χ^2 -statistic are known.

Theorem 1 ([17]). *When H_0 is true, χ^2 statistic given by equation (1) follows χ^2 distribution whose freedom is $m - 1$ approximately. In addition, the expected mean or variance is calculated by $E_{H_0}(\chi^2) = m - 1$ or $V_{H_0}(\chi^2) = 2(m - 1)$, respectively.*

Theorem 2 ([17]). *When H_1 is true, χ^2 statistic given by equation (1) follows non-central χ^2 distribution whose freedom is $m - 1$ approximately. In addition, the mean or variance is computed by $E_{H_1}(\chi^2) = m - 1 + n\theta$ or $V_{H_1}(\chi^2) = 2(m - 1) + 4n\theta$, respectively, where $n\theta$ so called noncentral parameter is $n\theta = n \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \frac{(\pi_i - P(a_i))^2}{\pi_i}$, where $P(a_i)$ is the probability of occurrence of a_i .*

In our case of which distinguishes a non-uniformly random distribution from uniformly random distribution [7–9], the probability π is equal to $\frac{1}{m}$ and, thus, equation (1) is simply described as follows.

$$\chi^2 = \frac{m}{n} \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \left(n_i - \frac{n}{m} \right)^2. \quad (3)$$

Table 2 presents threshold for a 63 degrees of freedom. For example, (level, χ^2_{63}) = (0.95, 82.53) in Table 2 means that the value of the χ^2 -statistic exceeds 82.53 in the probability of 5% if the observation X is uniform.

Table 2. χ^2 -distributions with a 63 degree of freedom

Level	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.95	0.99
χ^2_{63}	62.33	65.20	68.37	72.20	77.75	82.53	92.01

Let us describe other statistical facts together with the notation.

Theorem 3 (Central Limit Theorem [2]). *Choose a random sample from a population which mean or variance is μ or σ^2 , respectively. If the sample size n is large, then*

the sampling distribution of the mean is closely approximated by the normal distribution, regardless of the population, where the mean or variance is given by μ or σ^2/n , respectively.

We also follow commonly used notation: the probability density and the cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal distribution are denoted by $\phi(x)$ and $\Phi(x)$; the probability of distribution X in the range $X \leq I$ is denoted by $\Pr(X \leq I)$; and \mathcal{N} is used for the normal distributions. The probability density function of the normal distribution with the mean μ and the variance σ^2 , $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$, is given by the following equation,

$$\phi_{(\mu, \sigma^2)}(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \exp\left[-\frac{(x - \mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right].$$

2.2 Block cipher RC6

Before showing the encryption algorithm of RC6, we give some notation.

- $\{0, 1\}^k$: k -bit data
- $\text{lsb}_n(X)$: least significant n -bit of X ;
- $\text{msb}_n(X)$: most significant n -bit of X ;
- \oplus : bit-wise exclusive OR;
- $a \lll b$: cyclic rotation of a to the left by b -bit;
- S_i : i -th subkey (S_{2i} and S_{2i+1} are subkeys of the i -th round);
- r : number of rounds;
- (A_i, B_i, C_i, D_i) : input of the i -th round ;
- (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) : plaintext;
- $(A_{r+2}, B_{r+2}, C_{r+2}, D_{r+2})$: ciphertext after r -round encryption;
- $f(x) : x \times (2x + 1)$;
- $F(x) : f(x) \pmod{2^{32}} \lll 5$;
- $x||y$: concatenated value of x and y .

The detailed algorithm of RC6 is given:

Algorithm 1 (RC6 Encryption Algorithm)

1. $A_1 = A_0$; $B_1 = B_0 + S_0$; $C_1 = C_0$; $D_1 = D_0 + S_1$;
2. for $i = 1$ to r do: $t = F(B_i)$; $u = F(D_i)$; $A_{i+1} = B_i$;
 $B_{i+1} = ((C_i \oplus u) \lll t) + S_{2i+1}$; $C_{i+1} = D_i$; $D_{i+1} = ((A_i \oplus t) \lll u) + S_{2i}$;
3. $A_{r+2} = A_{r+1} + S_{2r+2}$; $B_{r+2} = B_{r+1}$; $C_{r+2} = C_{r+1} + S_{2r+3}$; $D_{r+2} = D_{r+1}$.

Parts 1 and 3 of Algorithm 1 are called pre-whitening and post-whitening, respectively. A version of RC6 is specified as RC6- $w/r/b$. In this paper, we simply write RC6 if we deal with RC6-32. We also call the version of RC6 without post-whitening to, simply, RC6P.

2.3 A Transition Matrix

A transition matrix describes input-output transition, which was introduced in [14] and applied to RC6-8 and RC6-32 in [16]. In [16], the transition matrix can

compute the expected χ^2 -values on $\text{lsb}_5(A_{r+2})\|\text{lsb}_5(C_{r+2})$ when plaintexts with $\text{lsb}_5(A_0) = \text{lsb}_5(C_0) = 0$ are chosen, which is denoted by **TM** in this paper. So **TM** also gives the probability of occurrence of $\text{lsb}_5(A_{r+2})\|\text{lsb}_5(C_{r+2})$. We apply **TM** to compute the expected χ^2 -values and the variance on $\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+2})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+2})$ when plaintexts with a fixed value of $\text{lsb}_5(B_0) = \text{lsb}_5(D_0)$ are chosen.

3 χ^2 Attack on RC6P

In this section, we review χ^2 -attack on RC6P [5] and the success probability [10], which is computed by using the result of distinguishing attack.

Intuitively, the key recovery algorithm fixes some bits out of $\text{lsb}_n(B_0)\|\text{lsb}_n(D_0)$, checks the χ^2 -value of $\text{lsb}_3(A_r)\|\text{lsb}_3(C_r)$ and recovers $\text{lsb}_2(S_{2r})\|\text{lsb}_2(S_{2r+1})$ of r -round RC6P. Let us set:

$(y_b, y_d) = (\text{lsb}_3(B_{r+1}), \text{lsb}_3(D_{r+1}))$, $(x_c, x_a) = (\text{lsb}_5(F(A_{r+1})), \text{lsb}_5(F(C_{r+1})))$,
 $(s_a, s_c) = (\text{lsb}_2(S_{2r}), \text{lsb}_2(S_{2r+1}))$ and $s = s_a\|s_c$, where x_a (resp. x_c) is the rotation amounts on A_r (resp. C_r) in the r -th round.

Algorithm 2 ([5])

1. Choose a plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) with $(\text{lsb}_5(B_0), \text{lsb}_5(D_0)) = (0, 0)$ and encrypt it.
2. For each (s_a, s_c) , decrypt $y_d\|y_b$ with a key $0\|s_a, 0\|s_c$ by 1 round to $z_a\|z_c$, which are denoted by a 6-bit integer $z = z_a\|z_c$.
3. For each s , x_a , x_c , and z , update each array by incrementing $\text{count}[s][x_a][x_c][z]$.
4. For each s , x_a , and x_c , compute $\chi^2[s][x_a][x_c]$.
5. Compute the average $\text{ave}[s]$ of $\{\chi^2[s][x_a][x_c]\}_{x_a, x_c}$ for each s and output s with the highest $\text{ave}[s]$ as $\text{lsb}_2(S_{2r})\|\text{lsb}_2(S_{2r+1})$.

We may note that Algorithm 2 can be easily generalized to recover an e -bit key for an even e . In such a case, z is an $(e + 2)$ -bit number, on which χ^2 -value is computed. The success probability of Algorithm 2 is derived theoretically from Theorem 4, where the success probability means the probability of recovering a correct key in Algorithm 2.

Theorem 4 ([5]). *Let $n \geq 10$ and $r \geq 4$. The success probability P_s of Algorithm 2 on r -round RC6P with 2^n plaintexts can be evaluated by using the distribution of χ^2 -values in the distinguishing attack as follows,*

$$P_s = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_{c[r,n]}(x) \cdot \left(\int_{-\infty}^x f_{w[r,n]}(u) du \right)^{2^e - 1} dx, \quad (4)$$

where $f_{c[r,n]}(x)$ or $f_{w[r,n]}$ is a probability density function of distribution of χ^2 -values on a correct or wrong key in Algorithm 2, given by

$$f_{c[r,n]}(x) = \phi_{(\mu_{d[r-1,n-10]}, \sigma_{d[r-1,n-10]}^2 / 2^{10})}(x) \quad (5)$$

or

$$f_{w[r,n]}(x) = \phi_{(\mu_{d[r+1,n-10]}, \sigma_{d[r+1,n-10]}^2/2^{10})}(x), \quad (6)$$

respectively, and $\mu_{d[r,n]}(\sigma_{d[r,n]}^2)$ is mean (variance) of distribution of χ^2 -values on $\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+1})$ of r -round RC6P with $\text{lsb}_5(B_0)\|\text{lsb}_5(D_0) = 0$ by using 2^n plaintexts.

4 Success Probability of χ^2 Attack on RC6P

This section gives the theorem to compute the success probability of Algorithm 2 without any assumption of distinguishing attack.

4.1 Theoretical Mean and Variance of χ^2 -values

To compute the success probability of Algorithm 2 without any experimental results of distinguishing attack, we have to compute the mean and variance, $\mu_{d[r,n]}$ and $\sigma_{d[r,n]}^2$ theoretically, that is, we have to compute θ_r . In our case, θ_r is given as

$$\theta_r = 2^6 \sum \left(P(\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+1})) - \frac{n}{2^6} \right)^2, \quad (7)$$

where the summation is over $\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+1}) \in \{0, 1\}^6$ and $P(\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+1}))$ is the probability of occurrence of $\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+1})$. Thus, θ_r can be given by computing $P(\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+1}))$ and derived theoretically by TM in Section 2, which follows the discussion below.

Algorithm 2 is based on such a distinguishing attack that chooses $\text{lsb}_5(B_0) = \text{lsb}_5(D_0) = 0$ and computes the χ^2 -value on $\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_3(C_{r+1})$ which are outputs of r -round RC6P. Therefore we can apply TM to our distinguishing attack by assuming that (A_1, B_1, C_1, D_1) is a plaintext since $A_1 = B_0, C_1 = D_0$, and both B_1 and D_1 are random number. On the other hand, we compute the χ^2 -value on $(e+2)$ -bit $\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(C_{r+1})$ in e -bit-key-recovery Algorithm 2, whose probability of occurrence is derived by using TM from the following Lemma 1.

Lemma 1. *The probability of occurrence of $\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(C_{r+1})$, denoted by $P(\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(C_{r+1}))$, is computed from the probability of occurrence of $\text{lsb}_5(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_5(C_{r+1})$ as follows*

$$P(\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(C_{r+1})) = \sum_{i=0}^{2^\beta-1} \sum_{j=0}^{2^\beta-1} P(i\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(A_{r+1})\|j\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(C_{r+1})),$$

where $\beta = 5 - (e/2 + 1)$ and e is an even integer from 2 to 10.

Proof. Lemma 1 holds because

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{lsb}_5(A_{r+1})\|\text{lsb}_5(C_{r+1}) \\ &= \text{msb}_\beta(\text{lsb}_5(A_{r+1}))\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(A_{r+1})\|\text{msb}_\beta(\text{lsb}_5(C_{r+1}))\|\text{lsb}_{e/2+1}(C_{r+1}). \end{aligned}$$

■

Table 3. χ^2 -values of 3- or 5-round RC6P

#texts	3 rounds				5 rounds				
	Theoretical		Experimental		#texts	Theoretical		Experimental	
	mean	variance	mean	variance		mean	variance	mean	variance
2^8	63.20	126.82	63.18	126.50	2^{24}	63.20	126.80	63.30	125.72
2^9	63.41	127.64	63.27	126.78	2^{25}	63.40	127.60	63.43	128.48
2^{10}	63.82	129.29	63.79	125.02	2^{26}	63.80	129.19	63.72	128.94
2^{11}	64.64	132.57	64.33	130.48	2^{27}	64.60	132.34	64.50	132.11
2^{12}	66.29	139.14	65.92	139.85	2^{28}	66.19	138.78	66.16	141.22

We show theoretical and experimental results of mean and variance of χ^2 -values of 3- or 5-round RC6P in Tables 3, respectively. Experiments are done by using 100 keys \times 100 kinds texts. We see that both mean and variance of χ^2 -value can be computed theoretically.

4.2 Success Probability of Algorithm 2 on RC6P

By using the theoretical mean and variance in Section 4.1, the success probability of Algorithm 2 is proved as follows.

Theorem 5. *The success probability of e -bit-key-recovery Algorithm 2 of r -round RC6P is given as follows,*

$$P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \Phi_{((k-1)+m\theta_{r-1},(2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10})}(x) \cdot \left(\int_{-\infty}^x \Phi_{((k-1)+m\theta_{r+1},(2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10})}(u) du \right)^{2^e-1} dx, \quad (8)$$

where 2^n is the number of texts; $m = 2^{n-10}$; $k = 2^{e+2}$; $m\theta_r$ is r -round non-central parameter; and e is an even integer from 2 to 10.

Proof. P_s in Theorem 4 is derived by mean $\mu_{d[r,n]}$ and variance $\sigma_{d[r,n]}^2$ of distribution of χ^2 -values, which are computed by non-central parameter from Theorem 2. On the other hand, θ_r is computed by using Lemma 1. Thus we get $P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n)$. ■

Table 4 shows the success probability of Algorithm 2. According to Table 4, the theoretical estimation gives the upper bound of results. It seems rather rough upper bound. We will discuss the reason in Section 5.

Table 4. Theoretical and experimental success probabilities of 4-round RC6P ($e = 4$).

# texts	2^{18}	2^{19}	2^{20}	2^{21}	2^{22}
Theoretical	0.16	0.31	0.70	0.99	1.00
Experimental	0.10	0.17	0.34	0.75	1.00

4.3 Applicable Round of RC6P

By computing θ_r of each round r , we derive the number of texts to recover a correct key by Algorithm 2. We approximate Equation (8) to reduce the computation amount to get (8) for an even large e .

Theorem 6. *The sufficient condition for $P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) \geq 0.95$ is given as*

$$\tilde{P}_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) \geq 1 - \frac{1}{20(2^e - 1)}, \quad (9)$$

where

$$\tilde{P}_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r-1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10})}(x) \cdot \int_{-\infty}^x \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r+1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10})}(u) du dx;$$

$m = 2^{n-10}$; $k = 2^{e+2}$; $m\theta_r$ is r -round non-central parameter; and e is an even integer from 2 to 10.

Proof. We show that n satisfied with Equation (9) is sufficient for $P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) \geq 0.95$. First of all, we consider the following equation

$$F(e) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{20(2^e - 1)}\right)^{2^e - 1}.$$

When $e \geq 1$, $F(e)$ is a monotonically increasing function, satisfies $F(e) \geq 0.95$ and

$$\lim_{e \rightarrow \infty} \left(1 - \frac{1}{20(2^e - 1)}\right)^{2^e - 1} \approx 0.951.$$

On the other hand, Equation (8) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r-1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10})}(x) \cdot \left(\int_{-\infty}^x \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r+1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10})}(u) du \right)^{2^e - 1} dx \\ &\geq \left(\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r-1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10})}(x) \cdot \int_{-\infty}^x \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r+1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10})}(u) du dx \right)^{2^e - 1} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $m = 2^{n-10}$ satisfies

$$\left(\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r-1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10})}(x) \cdot \int_{-\infty}^x \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r+1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10})}(u) du dx \right)^{2^e-1} \geq F(e),$$

then $P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) \geq 0.95$. Therefore, if n satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \widetilde{P}_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) &= \\ & \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r-1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10})}(x) \cdot \int_{-\infty}^x \phi_{(k-1+m\theta_{r+1}, (2(k-1)+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10})}(u) du dx \\ & \geq 1 - \frac{1}{20(2^e - 1)}, \end{aligned}$$

then $P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) \geq 0.95$. ■

Table 5. Theoretical and estimated #texts for $P_{S_{rc6p,4}}(n) \geq 0.95$ or $P_s \geq 0.95$.

round	Theoretical (Th.6)		Estimated (Th.4)	
	# texts	Work †	# texts	Work ‡
4	$2^{20.69}$	$2^{24.69}$	$\dagger 2^{21.60}$	$\dagger 2^{25.60}$
6	$2^{36.73}$	$2^{39.67}$	$2^{37.64}$	$2^{41.64}$
8	$2^{52.76}$	$2^{56.76}$	$2^{53.68}$	$2^{57.68}$
10	$2^{68.79}$	$2^{72.79}$	$2^{69.72}$	$2^{73.72}$
12	$2^{84.81}$	$2^{88.81}$	$2^{85.76}$	$2^{89.76}$
14	$2^{100.82}$	$2^{104.82}$	$2^{101.80}$	$2^{105.80}$
16	$2^{116.83}$	$2^{119.77}$	$2^{117.84}$	$2^{121.84}$
18	$2^{132.85}$	$2^{136.85}$	$2^{133.88}$	$2^{137.88}$

† : experimental result [5]

‡ : the number of incrementing *cnt*.

Here we set $e = 4$. Table 5 shows theoretical and experimental number of texts necessary for $P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n) \geq 0.95$ in each r round. From Table 5, Algorithm 2 is faster than exhaustive search for 128-bit-key RC6P with up to 16 rounds. It corresponds with the previous experimental result [5]. Our theorem estimates the number of texts necessary for recovering r -round RC6P with the success probability of more than 95% to

$$\log_2(\#\text{texts}) = 8.01r - 11.63. \quad (10)$$

On the other hand, it is estimated in [5] heuristically as

$$\log_2(\#\text{texts}) = 8.02r - 10.48. \quad (11)$$

We see that both estimations are pretty close each other.

Table 6. Theoretical and experimental success probability of 4-round RC6P-8 by using Algorithm 2.

# texts	Theoretical	Experimental
2^{12}	0.742	0.228
2^{13}	1.000	0.481
2^{14}	1.000	0.888
2^{15}	1.000	1.000

4.4 Success Probability of Algorithm 2 on RC6P-8

We also demonstrate our theorem on 4-round RC6P-8 whose word size is 8-bit. Table 6 shows the theoretical and experimental results of Algorithm 2 on RC6P-8. In the same way as 4-round RC6P, we see that theoretical estimation gives the upper bound of experimental results.

5 χ^2 Attack against RC6

This section improves Algorithm 2 to a key recovery attack against RC6, Algorithm 3, and then gives the theorem that computes the success probability. We also implement Algorithm 3 on 4-round RC6-8 and demonstrate the accuracy of the theorem. Furthermore we also discuss the difference between Theorem 5 and 7 in view of accuracy.

5.1 Key Recovery Algorithm and Theoretical Success Probability

The primitive extension of Algorithm 2 to a key recovery attack on RC6 is to decrypt $y_a || y_d$ for each key candidate of s, S_{2r+2} and S_{2r+3} , which is shown in [5]. Apparently it is rather straightforward since it means that it decrypts each ciphertext by each 2^{68} key. So we improve Algorithm 2 such that it does not have to decrypt each ciphertext. Before showing the algorithm, let us use the following notation:

$$\mathcal{U} = \{u \in \{0, 1\}^{32} | \text{msb}_5(u \times (2u + 1)) = 0\}, (u_a, u_c) \in \mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{U}, t_a = A_{r+2} - u_a, t_c = C_{r+2} - u_c, \\ v = \text{lsb}_5(B_0) || \text{lsb}_5(D_0), z = \text{lsb}_3(B_{r+2}) || \text{lsb}_3(D_{r+2}).$$

Algorithm 3

1. Choose a plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) and encrypt it to $(A_{r+2}, B_{r+2}, C_{r+2}, D_{r+2})$.
3. For each (u_a, u_c) , compute both t_a and t_c and update each array by incrementing $\text{count}[t_a][t_c][v][z]$.
4. For each t_a, t_c and v , compute the χ^2 -value $\chi^2[t_a][t_c][v]$.
5. Compute the average $\text{ave}[t_a][t_c]$ of $\{\chi^2[t_a][t_c][v]\}_v$ for each t_a, t_c and output t_a, t_c with the highest $\text{ave}[t_a][t_c]$ as S_{2r+2}, S_{2r+3} .

Algorithm 3 computes the χ^2 -value on 6-bit z , which follows the idea of Algorithm 2. Compared with [8], in which the χ^2 -value is computed on 10-bit data, Algorithm 3 seems to recover a correct key efficiently.

We may note that Algorithm 3 calculates the χ^2 -value on $z = \text{lsb}_3(B_{r+2}) \parallel \text{lsb}_3(D_{r+2})$ by using such plaintexts that make the final-round-notation 0 for each key candidate. For a correct key, this is exactly equivalent to compute the χ^2 -value on $\text{lsb}_3(A_r) \parallel \text{lsb}_3(C_r)$, which is output of $(r - 1)$ -round RC6P because the addition keeps the χ^2 -value. Thus, we succeed to skip the post-whitening and get that the probability density function of distribution of χ^2 -value with a correct key in r -round RC6 is equal to $f_{c[r,n]}$ defined in Theorem 4. On the other hand, in the case of wrong keys, this is exactly equivalent to compute the χ^2 -value on $\text{lsb}_3(A_{r+2}) \parallel \text{lsb}_3(C_{r+2})$, which is output of $(r + 1)$ -round RC6P. Thus, we get that the probability density function of distribution of χ^2 -value with a wrong key in r -round RC6 is equal to $f_{w[r,n]}$ defined in Theorem 4. From the above discussion, we've proved the following theorem.

Theorem 7. *The success probability of Algorithm 3 on r -round RC6 is given theoretically as*

$$P_{S_{rc6}}(n) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_{(2^{6-1+m\theta_{r-1}}(2^{2^6-1})+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10}}(x) \cdot \left(\int_{-\infty}^x \phi_{(2^{6-1+m\theta_{r+1}}(2^{2^6-1})+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10}}(u) du \right)^{2^{64}-1} dx, \quad (12)$$

where 2^n is the number of texts, $m = 2^{n-20}$ and $m\theta_r$ is r -round non-central parameter.

Table 7. #texts necessary for $P_{S_{rc6}}(n) \geq 0.95$ (From Th.8)

r	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18
# texts	$2^{31.06}$	$2^{47.10}$	$2^{63.13}$	$2^{79.15}$	$2^{95.17}$	$2^{111.19}$	$2^{127.20}$	$2^{143.21}$
work [†]	$2^{85.06}$	$2^{101.10}$	$2^{117.13}$	$2^{133.15}$	$2^{149.17}$	$2^{165.19}$	$2^{181.20}$	$2^{197.21}$

[†]: a time to increment of cnt .

We approximate Equation (12) to reduce the computation amount to get (12) in the same way as Theorem 5. Theorem 8 is pretty effective to compute n with $P_{S_{rc6}}(n) \geq 0.95$ since the computation of exponentiation $2^{64} - 1$ on an integral part in (12) is eliminated.

Theorem 8. *The sufficient condition for $P_{S_{rc6}}(n) \geq 0.95$ is*

$$\tilde{P}_{S_{rc6}}(n) \geq 1 - \frac{1}{20(2^{64} - 1)},$$

Table 8. Theoretical and experimental success probability of 4-round RC6-8 (Alg. 3)

# texts	2^{17}	2^{18}	2^{19}	2^{20}
Theoretical	0.00	0.05	0.73	1.00
Experimental	0.00	0.04	0.76	1.00

where

$$\tilde{P}_{S_{rc6}}(n) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_{(2^6-1+m\theta_{r-1}, (2(2^6-1)+4m\theta_{r-1})/2^{10})}(x) \cdot \int_{-\infty}^x \phi_{(2^6-1+m\theta_{r+1}, (2(2^6-1)+4m\theta_{r+1})/2^{10})}(u) du dx,$$

$m = 2^{n-20}$ and $m\theta_r$ is r -round non-central parameter.

Table 7 shows the necessary number of texts and work which make success probability of Algorithm 3 on RC6 95% or more. The necessary number of texts is computed by Theorem 8. “Work” means the time to increment of counter cnt . Note that the number of available texts is bounded by 2^{128} in Algorithm 3. Therefore, we see from Table 7 that Algorithm 3 is applicable to 192-bit-key and 256-bit-key RC6 with up to 16 rounds. Thus, our results can answer the open question of [8], that is whether or not the χ^2 attack works on RC6 with 16 rounds or more.

In [8], they estimated heuristically that 192-bit-key or 256-bit-key RC6 are broken up to 14 or 15 rounds by their key recovery algorithm, respectively. We’ve now proved theoretically that 192-bit-key and 256-bit-key RC6 can be broken in up to 16 rounds. In Algorithm 3, we recover both post-whitening keys at once. As a result, the number of work is $\#texts \times 2^{27 \times 2}$, and thus it works on an 128-bit-key RC6 with up to 8 rounds. But we can reduce the amount of work by recovering either post-whitening key at once to $\#texts \times 2^{27}$. Then it works on 128-bit-key RC6 with up to 12 rounds, which will be shown in the final paper.

5.2 Success Probability of Algorithm 3 on RC6-8

We also demonstrate Theorem 7 on 4-round RC6-8. Table 8 shows the theoretical and experimental results. We see that theoretical estimation gives a pretty good approximation compared with Table 6. Let us discuss the reason. In Algorithm 2, we assume that the χ^2 -values of wrong keys in r -round RC6P equals that in $(r + 1)$ -round RC6P to estimate $P_{S_{rc6p,e}}(n)$. However, this is exactly upper bound of χ^2 -values of wrong keys. In the case of Algorithm 3, the χ^2 -values of wrong keys in r -round RC6 are equal to that in $(r + 1)$ -round RC6P. Thus, we see that theoretical estimation of Theorem 7 is much better than that of Theorem 5.

6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have improved the χ^2 -attack on RC6P to the χ^2 -attack on RC6 and proved the theorems that evaluate the success probability in both χ^2 -attacks. The derived formulae can be computed efficiently and provide a theoretical analysis of the success probability in the χ^2 -attack. We have also demonstrated that our theorems can estimate success probability in χ^2 -attacks against 4-round RC6P, RC6P-8, and RC6-8. Furthermore we have shown theoretically that our χ^2 -attack is applicable to 192-bit-key and 256-bit-key RC6 with up to 16 rounds by using $2^{127.20}$ plaintexts.

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