Proof Score Approach to Verification of Liveness Properties

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SUMMARY Proofs written in algebraic specification languages are called proof scores. The proof score approach to design verification is attractive because it provides a flexible way to prove that designs for systems satisfy properties. Thus far, however, the approach has focused on safety properties. In this paper, we describe a way to verify that designs for systems satisfy liveness properties with the approach. A mutual exclusion protocol using a queue is used as an example. We describe the design verification and explain how it is verified that the protocol satisfies the lockout freedom property.

key words: CafeOBJ, equations, observational transition systems (OTSs), rewriting, specification

1. Introduction

The proof score approach to design verification is a formal method of verifying that a design for a system satisfies a property. In the approach, a design for a system is specified in an algebraic specification language, a property is expressed in the language, and it is verified that the design satisfies the property by writing proofs (or proof plans) called proof scores in the language and executing the proof scores with a processor of the language.

We have argued in [2] that the approach has several attractive characteristics thanks to (1) balanced human-computer interaction and (2) flexible but clear structure of proof scores. The former means that humans are able to focus on proof plans, while tedious and detailed computations can be left to computers; humans do not necessarily have to know what deductive rules or equations should be applied to goals to prove. The latter means that lemmas do not need to be proved in advance and proof scores can help humans comprehend the corresponding proofs; a proof that a system satisfies a property can be conducted even when all lemmas used have not been proved, and assumptions used are explicitly and clearly written in proof scores.

The OTS/CafeOBJ method [3]–[5] is an instance of the proof score approach to design verification. The main ingredients of the OTS/CafeOBJ method are observational transition systems (OTSs) and CafeOBJ. OTSs are a kind of transition system (or state machine), which can be used as mathematical models of designs for systems, and CafeOBJ [6] is an executable algebraic specification language and system. Given a problem that a design for a system satisfies a property, in the OTS/CafeOBJ method, (1) the design is modeled as an OTS, which is written in CafeOBJ, (2) the property is expressed as a CafeOBJ term, and (3) it is verified that the OTS satisfies the property by writing proof scores in CafeOBJ and executing them with CafeOBJ. A survey of proof scores in CafeOBJ is described in [7].

We have conducted case studies [8]–[10] to demonstrate the usefulness of the OTS/CafeOBJ method. Thus far, however, the OTS/CafeOBJ method has mainly focused on invariant properties, which are safety properties. This paper shows that the method can also deal with other kinds of properties, especially ensures and leads-to properties, which are liveness properties. A mutual exclusion protocol using a queue, which is called Qlock [5], is used as an example; it is verified that Qlock satisfies the lockout (or starvation) freedom property, which can be expressed as a leads-to property.

The OTS/CafeOBJ method has been largely influenced by UNITY [11]. Although UNITY has been widely used to design parallel and distributed systems, UNITY itself does not provide any tool support. Therefore, some formal methods and tools have been used to support UNITY [12]–[14]. The OTS/CafeOBJ method may be regarded as one of such formal methods and tools. None of the existing formal methods and tools to support UNITY is based on the proof score approach to design verification. This is the essential difference between the OTS/CafeOBJ method and the others.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes OTSs including the five basic properties. Section 3 introduces CafeOBJ. Section 4 describes proof scores of ensures and leads-to properties. Section 5 reports on a case study in which it is verified that Qlock satisfies the lockout freedom property. Section 6 mentions some related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Observational Transition Systems (OTSs)

We describe the definitions of basic concepts on observational transition systems, or OTSs, and five basic properties with respect to (wrt) OTSs.

2.1 Definitions

We suppose that there exists a universal state space denoted...
s-ty (the transition). Observer (the transition) itself is the instance of the observer. If an observer (a transition) does not have any indexes, the state between two states \( v_1, v_2 \in S \) is defined as \( \forall o: O. \forall x_1: D_o \ldots \forall x_m: D_{om}. (o_{x_1,...,x_m}(v_1) = o_{x_1,...,x_m}(v_2)) \). The set of initial states such that \( I \subseteq Y \).

The definition of each transition looks like:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{s.t.} & \quad (y_1,...,y_m) \\
\text{where} & \quad c\text{-t}_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) = D \quad \forall v.
\end{align*}
\]

The definition means that if \( c\text{-t}_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) \) holds for a given state \( v \), \( t_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) \) moves \( v \) to \( v' \) that satisfies all equations between \text{s.t.} and \text{where}, and if \( c\text{-t}_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) \) does not, then \( t_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) \) does not change \( v \). If \( o_{x_1,...,x_m}(v) \) equals \( o_{x_1,...,x_m}(v') \), the corresponding equation \( "o_{x_1,...,x_m}(v) = o_{x_1,...,x_m}(v')" \) can be omitted. The definition of \( c\text{-t}_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) \) is written after \text{where}. If \( c\text{-t}_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) \) holds for an arbitrary state \( v \), then “if \( c\text{-t}_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) \)” and “where \( c\text{-t}_{y_1,...,y_m}(v) = \ldots \)” may be omitted.

Given an OTS \( S \) and two states \( v, v' \in T \), if there exists an instance \( t_{b_1,...,b_n} \) of a transition \( t \in T \) such that \( t_{b_1,...,b_n}(v) = S v' \), we write \( v \sim_{S}^b v' \) and call \( v' \) a \text{t-successor state} of \( v \) wrt \( S \). \( b_1,...,b_n \) may be omitted from \( v \sim_{S}^b v' \) and \( v' \) may be called a successor state of \( v \) wrt \( S \).

A mutual exclusion protocol called Qlock using a queue is used as an example.

Example 1 (Qlock): The pseudo-code executed by each process \( i \) can be written as follows:

**Loop**

\[
\text{rs: put(queue, i)}
\]

\[
\text{wt: repeat until top(queue) = i}
\]

**Critical Section**

\[
\text{cs: get(queue)}
\]

queue is the queue of process IDs shared by all processes. \text{put(queue, i)} puts a process ID \( i \) into queue at the end. \text{get(queue)} deletes the top element from queue if queue is not empty, and \text{top(queue)} returns the top element of queue if queue is not empty. \text{rs}, \text{wt} and \text{cs} are labels given to the pseudo-code, standing for the remainder section, waiting and the critical section. Initially, each process \( i \) is at label \( \text{rs} \) and queue is empty. Let label \( \text{Pid} \) and \( \text{Queue} \) be the types of labels, process IDs and queues of process IDs, respectively.

Qlock can be modeled as the OTS \( S_{\text{Qlock}} \) such that

\[
O_{\text{Qlock}} \triangleq [\text{pc}_{\text{Pid}} : T \rightarrow \text{Label}, \text{queue} : T \rightarrow \text{Queue}]
\]

\[
I_{\text{Qlock}} \triangleq \{v \in T \mid \forall i : \text{Pid}(.\text{pc}_i(v) = \text{rs}) \land \text{queue}(v) = \text{empty}\}
\]

\[
T_{\text{Qlock}} \triangleq \{\text{want}_{\text{Pid}} : T \rightarrow T, \text{try}_{\text{Pid}} : T \rightarrow T, \text{exit}_{\text{Pid}} : T \rightarrow T\}
\]

where empty is the empty queue. The three transitions are defined as follows:

\[
\text{want}_{\text{pid}}(v) = v' \iff \text{c-want}(v) \text{ s.t.}
\]

\[
\text{pc}_i(v') = i \text{ then wt else pc}_i(v)
\]

\[
\text{where c-want}(v) \iff \text{pc}_i(v) = \text{rs}
\]

\[
\text{try}_i(v) = v' \iff \text{c-try}(v) \text{ s.t.}
\]

\[
\text{pc}_i(v') = i \text{ then cs else pc}_i(v)
\]

\[
\text{where c-try}(v) \iff i \text{ then cs else pc}_i(v)
\]

\[
\text{exit}_i(v) = v' \iff \text{c-exit}(v) \text{ s.t.}
\]

\[
\text{pc}_i(v') = i \text{ then rs else pc}_i(v)
\]

\[
\text{queue}(v') = \text{get(queue)}(v)
\]

\[
\text{where c-exit}(v) \iff \text{pc}_i(v) = \text{cs}
\]

where put, top and get are the same functions appearing in the pseudo-code.

Definition 2 (Reachable states): Given an OTS \( S \), \text{reachable states} wrt \( S \) are inductively defined:

- Each \( v \in I \) is reachable wrt \( S \).
- For each \( v, v' \in T \) such that \( v \sim S v' \), if \( v \) is reachable wrt \( S \), so is \( v' \).

Let \( \mathcal{R}_S \) be the set of all reachable states wrt \( S \).
2.2 Properties

Predicates whose types are \( \mathbb{I} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \) are called state predicates. We suppose that every state predicate considered in this paper does not have any quantifiers unless otherwise explicitly stated. Note that variables freely occurring in formulas are equivalent to universally quantified variables. There are five basic properties with respect to \( S \), which are inspired by UNITY [11].

**Definition 3 (Five Basic Properties):** Let \( p, q, r, p_i \) be arbitrary state predicates, and \( J \) be an arbitrary set. Given an OTS \( S \), the five properties are defined:

1. \( p \ \text{unless}_S q \equiv \forall v, v' : \mathcal{R}_S. \quad (v \leadsto_S v' \land p(v) \land \neg q(v) \Rightarrow p(v') \lor q(v')) \)
2. \( \text{stable}_S p \equiv p \ \text{unless}_S p \)
3. \( \text{invariant}_S q \equiv \forall v : \mathcal{R}_S. p(v) \)
4. \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \equiv (p \ \text{unless}_S q) \land \exists t : \mathbb{I} \exists b_1 : D_1 \ldots \exists b_m : D_m \forall v, v' : \mathcal{R}_S. \quad (v \leadsto_S v' \land p(v) \land \neg q(v) \Rightarrow q(v')) \)
5. \( p \ \text{leads-to}_S q \) holds if and only if this can be deduced by applying the three deductive rules finitely often:

\[
\begin{align*}
1. & \quad p \ \text{ensures}_S q & \quad p \leadsto_S q \\
2. & \quad p \leadsto_S q, q \leadsto_S r & \quad p \leadsto_S r \\
3. & \quad \forall j : J(p_j \leadsto_S q) & \quad (\exists j : J. p_j) \leadsto_S q
\end{align*}
\]

Note that \( \text{invariant}_S q \) can also be defined as \( \forall v : \mathbb{I}. p(v) \land \text{stable}_S p \), which is equivalent to \( \forall v : \mathcal{R}_S. p(v) \). The second conjunct of the definition of \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \) may be abbreviated as \( p \ \text{eventually}_S q \).

\( S \) may be omitted from \( \text{unless}_S, \text{stable}_S, \text{invariant}_S, \text{ensures}_S, \) and \( \text{leads-to}_S \) (\( \leadsto_S \)) if it is clear from context. The first three properties are classified into safety properties, while the remaining are classified into liveness properties.

We informally describe what the five properties say. \( p \ \text{unless}_S q \) says that whenever each instance of every transition is applied in a state where \( p \) holds and \( q \) does not hold, \( p \) or \( q \) holds in the successor state. It does not mention what occurs when an instance of a transition is applied in a state where \( p \) does not hold or \( q \) holds. It can be interpreted as follows: once \( p \) holds, \( p \) keeps holding unless \( q \) becomes true. \( \text{stable}_S p \) says that once \( p \) holds, \( p \) keeps holding, although \( p \) may never get true. \( \text{invariant}_S p \) says that \( p \) holds in every reachable state with \( S \).

Before describing what the remaining two properties say, we define executions of an OTS \( S \). An arbitrary infinite sequence \( v_0, v_1, \ldots \) of states satisfying the following three conditions is called an execution of \( S \):

- **Initiation:** \( v_0 \in \mathbb{I} \).
- **Consecution:** For each \( i \in \{0, 1, \ldots \} \), \( v_i \leadsto_S v_{i+1} \).
- **Fairness:** For each instance \( t_{y_1, \ldots, y_n} \) of every transition, there exist an infinite number of indexes \( i \) such that \( v_i \leadsto_S t_{y_1, \ldots, y_n} v_{i+1} \).

The first and second conditions guarantee that every state appearing in executions of \( S \) is reachable with respect to \( S \). The third condition says that each instance \( t_{y_1, \ldots, y_n} \) of every transition is applied infinitely many times in the course of every execution of \( S \), although the effective condition of \( t_{y_1, \ldots, y_n} \) may not hold in states in which \( t_{y_1, \ldots, y_n} \) is applied.

\[ p \ \text{ensures}_S q \] says that whenever there exists a state \( v_i \) in an arbitrary execution of \( S \) such that \( p \) holds in \( v_i \), there exists a state \( v_j \) in the execution such that \( j \geq i \) and \( q \) holds in \( v_j \). This is because \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \) specifies that \( p \) or \( q \) holds in the successor state after applying each instance of every transition in a state where \( p \) holds and \( q \) does not hold and that there exists an instance \( t_{y_1, \ldots, y_n} \) of a transition that makes \( q \) true when \( t_{y_1, \ldots, y_n} \) is applied in a state where \( p \) holds and \( q \) does not hold, and such an instance of a transition is eventually applied thanks to **Fairness**. \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \) can be interpreted as follows: whenever \( S \) reaches a state where \( p \) holds, \( S \) will eventually reach a state where \( q \) holds. Although \( p \leadsto_S q \) resembles \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \), \( p \) does not necessarily keep holding until \( q \) gets true in \( p \leadsto_S q \). **leads-to** properties are transitive from the definition, but **ensures** properties are not.

The role of **Fairness** is to make it possible to interpret \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \) as described in the previous paragraph. If we do not assume **Fairness**, \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \) does not necessarily mean that whenever \( S \) reaches a state where \( p \) holds, \( S \) will eventually reach a state where \( q \) holds because some transitions may be never applied from some time on. When \( \text{ensures} \) and **leads-to** properties are verified, we do not need to explicitly care about **Fairness** because the definitions of **ensures** and **leads-to** properties do not refer to **Fairness**.

Some readers may wonder if the three deductive rules for **leads-to** properties are sound and complete. Let \( \text{LT}(p, q) \) be the property that whenever \( S \) reaches a state where \( p \) holds, \( S \) will eventually reach a state where \( q \) holds. Whenever \( p \leadsto_S q \) is deduced by applying the rules finitely often, the rules are called sound if \( \text{LT}(p, q) \) holds. Whenever \( \text{LT}(p, q) \) holds, the rules are called complete if \( p \leadsto_S q \) is deduced by applying the rules finitely often. When we argue the soundness, all we have to do is to check if each rule is sound. The first rule is sound because \( p \ \text{ensures}_S q \) can be interpreted as \( \text{LT}(p, q) \) as described above. Since it is natural that \( \text{LT} \) is transitive, namely that \( \text{LT}(p, r) \) comes from \( \text{LT}(p, q) \) and \( \text{LT}(q, r) \), the second rule is sound. It is also natural that if \( \text{LT}(p_j, q) \) holds for all \( j \in J \), then \( \text{LT}((\exists j : J. p_j), q) \) holds because \( \exists j : J. p_j \) implies that some \( p_k \) holds. Therefore, the third rule is sound. For the completeness, we refer to the article [15].

**Example 3 (Properties of \( S_{Qlock} \)):** Let \( p(v, i), q(v, i) \) and \( r(v, i) \) be \( p_c(v) = c_s, p_c(v) = w_t \) and \( \text{top}(\text{queue}(v)) = i \), respectively. Some properties of \( S_{Qlock} \) are as follows:

1. \( (q(v, i) \land r(v, i)) \) unless \( p(v, i) \)
2. \textbf{stable} \((p(v, i) \land p(v, j)) \Rightarrow (i = j))

3. \textbf{invariant} \((p(v, i) \land p(v, j)) \Rightarrow (i = j))

4. \((q(v, i) \land r(v, i)) \text{ ensures } p(v, i))

5. \(q(v, i) \Rightarrow p(v, i))

The third property is called the \textit{mutual exclusion property} and the fifth property is called the \textit{lockout (or starvation) freedom property}. The five properties need to be verified. We will describe the verification of the fifth property in this paper. The verification needs eight \textbf{invariant} properties, three \textbf{ensures} properties and four \textbf{leads-to} properties as lemmas. Among the lemmas are the third and fourth properties.

\section{CafeOBJ}

CafeOBJ \cite{6} is an algebraic specification language and system mainly based on order-sorted algebras and hidden algebras \cite{16,17}. Data types are specified in terms of order-sorted algebras, and state machines such as OTSs are specified in terms of hidden algebras. Algebraic specifications of state machines are called \textit{behavioral specifications}. There are two kinds of sorts in CafeOBJ: \textit{visible sorts} and \textit{hidden sorts}. A visible sort denotes a data type, while a hidden sort denotes the state space of a state machine. There are three kinds of operators (or operations) \textit{wrt} hidden sorts: \textit{hidden constants}, \textit{action operators} and \textit{observation operators}. Hidden constants denote initial states of state machines, action operators denote state transitions of state machines, and observation operators let us know the situation where state machines are located. Both an action operator and an observation operator take a state of a state machine and zero or more data. The action operator returns the successor state of the state \textit{wrt} the state transition denoted by the action operator plus the data. The observation operator returns a value that characterizes the situation where the state machine is located.

Basic units of CafeOBJ specifications are \textit{modules}. CafeOBJ provides built-in modules. One of the most important built-in modules is \textit{BOOL} in which propositional logic is specified. \textit{BOOL} is automatically imported by almost every module unless otherwise stated. In \textit{BOOL} and its parent modules, declared are the visible sort \textit{Bool}, the constants \texttt{true} and \texttt{false} of \textit{Bool}, and operators denoting some basic logical connectives. Among the operators are \texttt{not}, \texttt{and}, \texttt{or} and \texttt{xor}, \texttt{implies} and \texttt{iff}, denoting negation (\texttt{not}), conjunction (\texttt{and}), disjunction (\texttt{or}), exclusive disjunction (\texttt{xor}), implication (\texttt{imp}) and logical equivalence (\texttt{eq}), respectively. An underscore \texttt{_} indicates the place where an argument is put such as \texttt{a and b}. The operator \texttt{if.then.else.} \texttt{fi} corresponding to the \texttt{if} construct in programming languages is also declared. CafeOBJ uses the Hsiang term rewriting system \cite{18} as the decision procedure for propositional logic, which is implemented in \textit{BOOL}. CafeOBJ reduces any term denoting a proposition that is always \texttt{true} (false) to \texttt{true} (false). More generally, a term denoting a proposition reduces to an exclusively disjunctive normal form of the proposition.

In the rest of this section, we describe how to specify data types and OTSs, and how to prove that data types satisfy properties by giving some examples, which will be used later.

\subsection{Specification in CafeOBJ}

We first specify \texttt{Label}, \texttt{PID}, \texttt{Nat} (that is the type of natural numbers) and \texttt{Queues}. \texttt{Label} is specified in the module \texttt{LABEL}:

\begin{verbatim}
mod! LABEL \{ [Label]
  ops rs wt cs : -> Label
  op _=_ : Label Label -> Bool \{comm\}
  \begin{varlist}
    var L : Label
    eq (L = L) = true .
    eq (rs = wt) = false .
    eq (rs = cs) = false .
    eq (wt = cs) = false .
  \end{varlist}
\}
\end{verbatim}

The keyword \texttt{mod!} indicates that the module is a tight semantics declaration, meaning the smallest model (implementation) that respect all requirements written in the module. Visible sorts are declared by enclosing them with [ and ]. \texttt{Label} is the visible sort of \texttt{labels}. The keyword \texttt{op} is used to declare (non-observation and action) operators, and \texttt{ops} to declare more than one such operator simultaneously. The operator \_\_\_\_ checks if two labels are equal. The keyword \texttt{comm} specifies that the operator \_\_\_\_ is commutative, namely that \texttt{11} = \texttt{12} equals \texttt{12} = \texttt{11}. The keyword \texttt{var} is used to declare variables, and \texttt{vars} to declare more than one variable simultaneously. \texttt{L} is a variable of \texttt{Label}. The keyword \texttt{eq} is used to declare equations, and \texttt{ceq} to declare conditional equations in which conditions are written after the keyword \texttt{if}. Equations and conditional equations are used to define operators and specify properties of operators. CafeOBJ uses declared equations as left-to-right rewrite rules to reduce terms.

\texttt{PID} is specified in the module \texttt{PID}:

\begin{verbatim}
mod* PID \{ [Pid]
  op _=_ : Pid Pid -> Bool \{comm\}
  \begin{varlist}
    var I : Pid
    eq (I = I) = true .
  \end{varlist}
\}
\end{verbatim}

The keyword \texttt{mod*} indicates that the module is a loose semantics declaration, meaning an arbitrary model (implementation) that respects all requirements written in the module.

\texttt{Nat} is specified in the module \texttt{PNAT}:

\begin{verbatim}
mod! PNAT \{ [Nat]
  op 0 : -> Nat op s : Nat -> Nat
  op _<_ : Nat Nat -> Bool
  op _=_ : Nat Nat -> Bool \{comm\}
  \begin{varlist}
    vars X Y : Nat
  \end{varlist}
\}
\end{verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
  eq \emptyset < \emptyset = \text{false} .
  eq \emptyset < s(X) = \text{true} .
  eq s(X) < s(Y) = X < Y .
  eq (X = X) = \text{true} .
  eq (s(X) = \emptyset) = \text{false} .
  eq (s(X) = s(Y)) = (X = Y) .
}\end{verbatim}

The constant \(\emptyset\) denotes zero and the operator \(_<_\) is the successor function of natural numbers. The operator \(_<_\) is the less-than predicate of natural numbers.

We first specify generic queues in the module QUEUE:

\begin{verbatim}
mod! QUEUE(D :: EQTRIV) { pr(PNAT) [Queue]
  op empty : -> Queue
  op _,_ : Elt.D Queue -> Queue
  op put : Queue Elt.D -> Queue
  op get : Queue -> Queue
  op top : Queue -> Elt.D
  op _\in_ : Elt.D Queue -> Bool
  op del : Queue Elt.D -> Queue
  op where : Queue Elt.D -> Nat
  op aux-where : Queue Elt.D -> Nat
  op _=_ : Queue Queue -> Bool {comm}
  vars Q R : Queue vars X Y : Elt.D
  eq put(empty,X) = X,empty .
  eq put((Y,Q),X) = Y,put(Q,X) .
  eq get(empty) = empty .
  eq get((X,Q)) = Q .
  eq top((X,Q)) = X .
  eq X \in empty = \text{false} .
  eq X \in (Y,Q) = (X = Y) or X \in Q .
  eq del(empty,Y) = empty .
  eq del((X,Q),Y) = if X=Y then Q else del(Q,Y) fi .
  eq where((X,Q),Y) = if Y \in (X,Q) then aux-where((X,Q),Y)
             else where(empty,Y) fi .
  eq aux-where((X,Q),Y) = if X=Y
             then \emptyset else s(aux-where(Q,Y)) fi .
  eq (Q = Q) = \text{true} .
  eq (X,Q = empty) = \text{false} .
  eq (X,Q = Y,R) = (X = Y and Q = R) .
}\end{verbatim}

The keyword pr is used to import modules. QUEUE imports PNAT. The constant empty denotes the empty queue and the operator _,_ is the constructor of non-empty queues. The operators put, get and top are usual functions of queues, and the operator _\in_ is the membership predicate of queues. The operator del deletes a given element from a given queue if any. The operator where returns the nearest position from top where a given element appears in a given queue if any.

QUEUE has one formal parameter D. Given a module that respects all the requirements in the module EQTRIV as an actual parameter, QUEUE is instantiated. EQTRIV is as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
mod* EQTRIV { [Elt]
  var X : Elt
  eq (X = X) = \text{true} .
}\end{verbatim}

When QUEUE is instantiated with an actual parameter M, visible sort Elt.D is replaced with the visible sort in M corresponding to the visible sort Elt in EQTRIV. For example, QUEUE(PID) is the module obtained by instantiating QUEUE with PID, specifying Queue.

Now that we have specified the data types used in S:\text{Qlock}, we next specify S:\text{Qlock} in the module QLOCK:

\begin{verbatim}
mod! QLOCK { pr(LABEL) pr(PID) pr(QUEUE(PID)) *[Sys]*
  -- an arbitrary initial state
  op init : -> Sys
  -- observers
  bop pc : Sys Pid -> Label
  bop queue : Sys -> Queue
  -- actions
  bops want try exit : Sys Pid -> Sys
  -- variables
  var S : Sys vars I,J : Pid
  -- equations defining init
  eq pc(init,I) = rs .
  eq queue(init) = empty .
  -- equations defining want
  op c-want : Sys Pid -> Bool
  eq c-want(S,I) = (pc(S,I) = rs) .
  ceq pc(want(S,I),J) = (if I = J then wt else pc(S,J) fi)
            if c-want(S,I) .
  ceq queue(want(S,I)) = put(queue(S),I) if c-want(S,I) .
  eq want(S,I) = S if not c-want(S,I) .
  -- equations defining try
  op c-try : Sys Pid -> Bool
  eq c-try(S,I) = (pc(S,I) = wt and top(queue(S)) = I) .
  ceq pc(try(S,I),J) = (if I = J then cs else pc(S,J) fi)
            if c-try(S,I) .
  eq queue(try(S,I)) = queue(S) .
  -- equations defining exit
  op c-exit : Sys Pid -> Bool
  eq c-exit(S,I) = (pc(S,I) = cs) .
  ceq pc(exit(S,I),J) = (if I = J then rs else pc(S,J) fi)
            if c-exit(S,I) .
  ceq queue(exit(S,I)) = get(queue(S)) if c-exit(S,I) .
  eq exit(S,I) = S if not c-exit(S,I) .
}\end{verbatim}

A comment starts with -- and terminates at the end of the line. Hidden sorts are declared by enclosing them with *[
and ]. Sys is the hidden sort denoting \('T\). The keyword \texttt{bop}\ is used to declare observation and action operators, and \texttt{bops}\ to declare more than one such operator simultaneously. The hidden constant \texttt{init}\ denotes an arbitrary initial state and the two observation and three action operators correspond to the two observers and three transitions of \(S_{Qlock}\), respectively. The operator \texttt{c-want}, \texttt{c-try} and \texttt{c-exit} denote the effective conditions \texttt{c-want}, \texttt{c-try} and \texttt{c-exit}, respectively. The module has the four sets of equations that define \texttt{init}, \texttt{want}, \texttt{try} and \texttt{exit}.

3.2 Verification with CafeOBJ

In this paper, we will discuss the verification that Qlock satisfies the lockout freedom property. The verification needs two lemmas on natural numbers and 10 lemmas on queues (see Appendix A). We describe the proofs of two of the 12 lemmas. The two lemmas are as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{eq nat-lemma2}(X) & = \text{not}(X = s(X)) . \\
\text{eq queue-lemma3}(q, x, y) & = (X \setminus \text{put}(q, Y) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{iff } (X = Y \text{ or } X \setminus \text{in } q).)
\end{align*}

where \(X\) in \texttt{nat-lemma2}\ is a CafeOBJ variable of \texttt{Nat}, and \(X, Y\) and \(q\) in \texttt{queue-lemma3}\ are CafeOBJ variables of \texttt{Elt.D}, \texttt{Elt.D} and \texttt{Queue}, respectively. The first equation is declared in the module \texttt{NAT}, and the second in the module \texttt{Queue}. The first lemma is proved by induction on \(X\), and the second by induction on \(q\).

The proof (written in CafeOBJ) of the first lemma is as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
open PNAT
  op x : -> Nat . eq x = 0 .
  red nat-lemma2(x) .
close

open PNAT
  ops x y : -> Nat . eq x = s(y) .
  red nat-lemma2(y) implies nat-lemma2(x) .
close
\end{verbatim}

The command \texttt{open} makes a temporary module that imports a given module and the command \texttt{close} destroys such a temporary module. The constants \(x\) and \(y\) denote arbitrary natural numbers. The term \texttt{nat-lemma2(y)} is the induction hypothesis. Such a proof written in CafeOBJ is called a \textit{proof score}. Fragments enclosed with \texttt{open} and \texttt{close} in proof scores are called \textit{proof passages}. The above proof score consists of two proof passages.

The two proof passages are of the base case and the induction case, respectively. What to prove in the base case is \texttt{nat-lemma2}(0), and what to prove in the induction case is \texttt{nat-lemma2}(s(y)) under the induction hypothesis \texttt{nat-lemma2}(y), where \(y\) denotes an arbitrary natural number. The proofs can be conducted by having CafeOBJ execute the proof passages. When CafeOBJ returns \texttt{true} for both the proof passages, the proofs are successful. CafeOBJ indeed returns \texttt{true} for the proof passages.

If CafeOBJ does not return \texttt{true} for some proof passage, you need to split the corresponding case into multiple sub-cases and/or to use some appropriate lemmas [3]. Note that although proof scores could be generated automatically [19], [20], human users basically need to write proof scores in the OTS/CafeOBJ method, which implies that human users are responsible for checking if all cases are covered.

The proof score of the second lemma is as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
open QUEUE
  op q : -> Queue . ops x y : -> Elt.D .
  eq q = empty .
  red queue-lemma3(q, x, y) .
close

open QUEUE
  ops q q' : -> Queue .
  ops x y z : -> Elt.D .
  eq q = z, q' . eq x = z .
  red queue-lemma3(q, x, y) .
close

open QUEUE
  ops q q' : -> Queue .
  ops x y z : -> Elt.D .
  eq q = z, q' . eq (x = z) = false .
  red queue-lemma3(q', x, y)
    implies queue-lemma3(q, x, y) .

close
\end{verbatim}

The first proof passage is of the base case, and the second and third proof passages are of the induction case. The induction case is split into the two sub-cases based on the proposition \(x = z\). In the sub-case corresponding to the second proof passage, the proposition holds. In the sub-case corresponding to the third proof passage, the proposition does not. \texttt{queue-lemma3(q', x, y)} is the induction hypothesis (precisely an instance of the induction hypothesis), which is used in the second sub-case (i.e. the third proof passage). CafeOBJ returns \texttt{true} for each of the three proof passages, which means that the second lemma is successfully proved.

Proof scores of invariant properties [3]–[5] are very similar to ones of lemmas (and theorems) on data types.

4. Proof Scores of Liveness Properties

We have described in [3]–[5] how to verify that an OTS \(S\) satisfies invariant properties based on proof scores. In this section, we describe how to verify that \(S\) satisfies \textit{ensures} and \textit{leads-to} properties based on proof scores. Proofs of \textit{ensures} properties consist of ones of \textit{unless} properties and \textit{stable} properties are specialized \textit{unless} properties. Therefore, proof scores described in this section also covers \textit{unless} and \textit{stable} properties. We suppose that \(S\) is specified in a module \texttt{SYSTEM} in which a hidden sort \(H\) is declared and invariant properties wrt \(S\) are written in a module \texttt{INV}.
4.1 Proof Scores of ensures Properties

The proof of \( p \text{ ensures}_S q \) consists of those of \( p \) unless \( S \) \( q \) and \( p \) eventually \( S \) \( q \). The former is called the unless case, and the latter the eventually case. We suppose that in addition to \( v \) whose type is \( R_S \), \( p \) and \( q \) have the free variables \( z_1, \ldots, z_a \), whose types are \( D_1, \ldots, D_a \).

We first describe the unless case. We declare the operators denoting \( p \) and \( q \), and their defining equations in a module \( \text{UNL} \) (which imports \( \text{SYSTEM} \) and \( \text{INV} \)) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{op \ un}_l & : H \ V_o \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\text{op \ un}_q & : H \ V_o \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\text{eq \ un}_l(S, Z_a) & = p(S, Z_a) \\
\text{eq \ un}_q(S, Z_a) & = q(S, Z_a).
\end{align*}
\]

\( V_o \) is an abbreviation of \( V_1 \ldots V_a \) and \( Z_a \) is an abbreviation of \( Z_1, \ldots, Z_a \). Each \( V_k \) is a visible sort corresponding to \( D_k \) and each \( Z_k \) is a CafeOBJ variable of \( V_k \). \( p(S, Z_a) \) and \( q(S, Z_a) \) are CafeOBJ terms denoting \( p \) and \( q \). We also declare a constant \( z_k \) denoting an arbitrary value of \( V_k \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, \alpha \) in \( \text{UNL} \). Let \( Z_\alpha \) be an abbreviation of \( z_1, \ldots, z_a \).

The basic formula to prove in the unless case is denoted by the operator, which is declared and defined in a module \( \text{USTEP} \) (which imports \( \text{UNL} \)) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{op \ ustep} & : V_o \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\text{eq \ ustep}(Z_a) & = (\text{un}_l(s, Z_a) \text{ and not(un}_q(s, Z_a))) \\
& \text{ implies } \\
& (\text{un}_l(s', Z_a) \text{ or un}_q(s', Z_a)).
\end{align*}
\]

\( s \) and \( s' \) are constants of \( H \). \( s \) denotes an arbitrary state and \( s' \) denotes an arbitrary successor state of \( s \). The constants are declared in \( \text{USTEP} \).

All needed is to prove \( \text{ustep}(Z_a) \) for each instance of every transition (every action operator). We often need case splitting and lemmas (which are invariant properties wrt \( S \) and/or lemmas on data types). Let us consider proving \( \text{ustep}(Z_a) \) for an arbitrary instance \( t_{y_1, \ldots, y_m} \) of a transition \( t \), which is denoted by a CafeOBJ action operator \( t \). We suppose that the case is split into \( L \) sub-cases characterized by \( L \) propositions \( \text{case}_1, \ldots, \text{case}_L \) such that \( \text{case}_1 \lor \ldots \lor \text{case}_L \Leftrightarrow \text{true} \). Then the proof score of each sub-case \( l \) looks like:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{open \ USTEP} \\
& \text{-- arbitrary objects} \\
& \text{op \ y}_1 : \rightarrow V_{y_1} \ldots \text{op \ y}_n : \rightarrow V_{y_n}. \\
& \text{-- assumptions} \\
& \text{Declarations of equations denoting case}_l. \\
& \text{-- successor state} \\
& \text{eq \ s'} = t(s, b_{y_n}). \\
& \text{-- check} \\
& \text{red \ Lems \ implies \ estep(Z_a)}. \\
& \text{close}
\end{align*}
\]

\( b_{y_n} \) is an abbreviation of \( b_1, \ldots, b_n \). Each \( b_k \) denotes \( b \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, n \). We may declare constants used in equations red \( \text{Lems} \) implies \( \text{ustep}(Z_a) \).

close

Each \( V_k \) is a visible sort corresponding to \( D_k \) for \( k = 1, \ldots n \). Each constant \( y_k \) denotes an arbitrary value of \( V_k \) for \( k = 1, \ldots n \). \( V_n \) is an abbreviation of \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \). A set of equations is used to denote case. We may declare other constants (which denote arbitrary values) used in equations denoting case. The constant \( s' \) is defined as \( t(s, y_n) \), which denotes an arbitrary \( t \)-successor state of \( s \) wrt \( S \).

\( \text{Lems} \) is a CafeOBJ term, which can be constructed by combining instances of invariant properties wrt \( S \) and/or lemmas on data types with conjunctions. \( \text{Lems} \) is used to exclude unreachable states from cases to consider. "\( \text{Lems} \) implies" may be omitted.

The variables \( z_1, \ldots, z_a \) occur freely in \( p \) and \( q \). Free variables are equivalent to universally quantified ones. Therefore, if some instance of \( \text{un}_l(s, Z_a) \) and \( \text{not(un}_q(s, Z_a))) \) reduces to \( \text{false} \) in the proof passage of the sub-case \( \text{case}_l \), the proof of the sub-case is discharged. Hence, \( \text{Lems} \) may include such an instance.

When CafeOBJ returns \( \text{true} \) for the proof passage of each sub-case \( l \), the proof of the unless case is successfully completed.

We next describe the eventually case. The basic formula to prove in the eventually case is denoted by the operator, which is declared and defined in a module \( \text{ESTEP} \) (which imports \( \text{UNL} \)) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{op \ estep} & : V_o \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\text{eq \ estep}(Z_a) & = (\text{un}_l(s, Z_a) \text{ and not(un}_q(s, Z_a))) \\
& \text{ implies } \text{un}_q(s', Z_a). \\
\end{align*}
\]

All needed is to prove that there exists a witness, namely an instance of a transition that makes \( \text{estep}(Z_a) \) true. We conjecture that \( b_{y_1, \ldots, y_m} \) is such an instance of a transition. As the unless case, we often need case splitting and lemmas. We suppose that the case is split into \( L \) sub-cases characterized by \( L \) propositions \( \text{case}_1, \ldots, \text{case}_L \) such that \( \text{case}_1 \lor \ldots \lor \text{case}_L \Leftrightarrow \text{true} \). Then the proof passage for each sub-case \( l \) looks like:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{open \ ESTEP} \\
& \text{-- arbitrary objects} \\
& \text{Declarations of constants if necessary.} \\
& \text{-- assumptions} \\
& \text{Declarations of equations denoting case}_l. \\
& \text{-- successor state} \\
& \text{eq \ s'} = t(s, b_{y_n}). \\
& \text{-- check} \\
& \text{red \ Lems \ implies \ estep(Z_a)}. \\
& \text{close}
\end{align*}
\]
denoting case. As the unless case, Lem may contain an instance of \( \text{unl}_p(s, Z_o) \) and \( \text{not}(\text{unl}_p(s, Z_o)) \).

When CafeOBJ returns true for the proof passage of each sub-case \( l \), the proof of the eventually case is successfully completed.

4.2 Proof Scores of leads-to Properties

Rewriting is used to verify that \( S \) satisfies leads-to properties based on deductive rules of leads-to. To this end, deductive rules of leads-to are written in terms of equations. When such deductive rules are written, however, we do not use the logical operators such as \(_\text{and}_\) and \(_\text{or}_\) declared and defined in the module BOOL and its parent modules. Basically, the left-hand side of an equation should be in normal (irreducible) form so that CafeOBJ can use the equation effectively as a rewrite rule. The normal form of a term such as \( p \lor q \) made of the logical operators is an exclusively disjunctive normal form such as \((q \land p) \lor q \lor p\). Exclusive disjunctive normal forms are hard to read. It is inconvenient to use such hard-to-read terms as the left-hand sides of equations.

Therefore, we declare new operators denoting basic logical connectives in a module OTSLOGIC as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{op } _- & : \text{Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \{\text{prec: 53}\} \\
\text{op } _\land & : \text{Bool Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
& \{\text{comm assoc prec: 55 r-assoc}\} \\
\text{op } _\lor & : \text{Bool Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
& \{\text{comm assoc prec: 59 r-assoc}\} \\
\text{op } _\Rightarrow & : \text{Bool Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
& \{\text{prec: 61 r-assoc}\} \\
\text{op } _\Leftrightarrow & : \text{Bool Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
& \{\text{comm prec: 63 r-assoc}\}
\end{align*}
\]

The operators denote negation \( (-) \), conjunction \( (\land) \), disjunction \( (\lor) \), implication \( (\Rightarrow) \) and logical equivalence \( (\Leftrightarrow) \), respectively. As \( \text{comm}, \text{assoc}, \text{r-assoc} \) and \( \text{prec} \) are attributes given to operators. \( \text{assoc} \) specifies that an operator \(_\_\) is associative, namely that \((a \land b) \land c = a \land (b \land c)\). \( \text{r-assoc} \) specifies that an operator \(_\_\) is right associative, namely that \(a \land (b \land c)\) is parsed as \((a \land b) \land c\), and \( \text{prec} \) specifies the precedence of an operator. A natural number is written after \( \text{prec} \). The greater the number, the weaker the precedence.

OTSLOGIC has an operator \( \text{eval} \) to evaluate terms made of these operators. The operator is declared and defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{op eval} & : \text{Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\text{eq eval}(\text{true}) & = \text{true} \\
\text{eq eval}(\text{false}) & = \text{false} \\
\text{eq eval}(\neg P) & = \text{not}(\text{eval}(P)) \\
\text{eq eval}(P \land Q) & = \text{eval}(P) \land \text{eval}(Q) \\
\text{eq eval}(P \lor Q) & = \text{eval}(P) \lor \text{eval}(Q) \\
\text{eq eval}(P \Rightarrow Q) & = \text{eval}(P) \Rightarrow \text{eval}(Q) \\
\text{eq eval}(P \Leftrightarrow Q) & = \text{eval}(P) \Leftrightarrow \text{eval}(Q)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( P \) and \( Q \) are CafeOBJ variables of \( \text{Bool} \). The variables are also used in the rest of this subsection. In addition, let \( P_1, Q_1, R, R_1 \) and \( R_2 \) be CafeOBJ variables of \( \text{Bool} \).

We use \text{invariant}, \text{ensures} and leads-to properties to reason about leads-to properties. Therefore, we declare the operators denoting these three kinds of properties in OTSLOGIC as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{op } \text{invariant}_- & : \text{Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\text{op } \text{ensures}_- & : \text{Bool Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\text{op } _\Rightarrow & : \text{Bool Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool}
\end{align*}
\]

The remainder of OTSLOGIC are equations denoting conditional deductive rules of leads-to properties. We use three kinds of conditional deductive rules of leads-to properties, which are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if } (p \Rightarrow p_1) \land (q_1 \Rightarrow q), & \text{ then } \frac{p_1 R_S q_1}{p \Rightarrow_S q} \\
\text{if } (p \Rightarrow p_1) \land (r \Rightarrow r_1) \land (q_1 \Rightarrow q), & \text{ then } \frac{p_1 R_1 S r_1 R_2 S q_1}{p \Rightarrow_S q} \\
\text{if } (p \Rightarrow p_1 \lor q_1) \land (r_1 \Rightarrow r_2) \land (r_1 \Rightarrow r), & \text{ then } \frac{p_1 R_1 S r_1 R_1 S q_1 R_2 S q_2}{p \Rightarrow_S r}
\end{align*}
\]

The three rules are parameterized. \( R_S, R_1 S \) and \( R_2 S \) are parameters. The three rules can be instantiated by replacing each of \( R_S, R_1 S \) and \( R_2 S \) with \( \Rightarrow, \text{ensures} \) and \( \Rightarrow \). Therefore, we have 21 conditional deductive rules of leads-to properties. A conditional deductive rule can be applied provided that the condition holds.

We straightforwardly prove that if \( p \Rightarrow q \), then \( p \Rightarrow_S q \) for an arbitrary OTS \( S \). This fact and the three deductive rules of leads-to properties in Definition 3 are used to prove that the 21 conditional deductive rules are valid.

Each of the 21 rules is denoted by one conditional equation. In this paper, the three equations denoting three of the 21 rules are shown:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ceq } ((P_1 \text{ ensures } Q_1) \Rightarrow (P \Rightarrow Q)) & = \text{true} \\
& \text{if } \text{eval}(P \Rightarrow P_1) \text{ and } \text{eval}(Q_1 \Rightarrow Q) \\
\text{ceq } ((P \Rightarrow R \land R_1) \Rightarrow Q_1) & \Rightarrow (P \Rightarrow Q) \\
& \text{if } \text{eval}(P \Rightarrow P_1) \text{ and } \\
& \text{eval}(R \Rightarrow R_1) \text{ and } \text{eval}(Q_1 \Rightarrow Q) \\
\text{ceq } ((P \Rightarrow R_1 \lor Q_1) \Rightarrow R_2) & \Rightarrow (P \Rightarrow R) \\
& \text{if } \text{eval}(P \Rightarrow (P_1 \lor Q_1)) \text{ and } \\
& \text{eval}(R_1 \Rightarrow R_2) \text{ and } \text{eval}(R_1 \Rightarrow R)
\end{align*}
\]

In addition to the 21 conditional equations denoting the 21 rules, one more conditional equation denoting a deductive rule of leads-to properties is declared in OTSLOGIC:

\[
\text{ceq } (P \Rightarrow Q) = \text{true} \text{ if } \text{eval}(P \Rightarrow Q)
\]

The deductive rule denoted by the conditional equation expresses the fact that if \( p \Rightarrow q \), then \( p \Rightarrow_S q \) for an arbitrary OTS \( S \).
We use one more conditional deductive rule of \texttt{leads-to} properties. The rule is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if} \quad (p & \Rightarrow p_1) \land (q_1 \Rightarrow q), \\
\text{then} \quad (p_1 \land M = m) & \Rightarrow S ((p_1 \land M < m) \lor q_1),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( m \) is an arbitrary value in an arbitrary set \( W \), \( M \) is an arbitrary function mapping \( \mathcal{I} \) to \( W \), and \(<\) is an arbitrary well-founded relation on \( W \). The definition of \texttt{leads-to} and the mathematical induction principle are used to prove that the rule is valid\cite{11}.

Since the rule has \( W \) as its parameter, the conditional equation denoting the rule is declared in a parameterized module \texttt{INDOFLTO}, which imports \texttt{OTSLOGIC}. An actual parameter of the module has to satisfy the requirements declared in a module \texttt{EQLTRIV}, which is as follows:

\[
\text{mod* EQLTRIV} \{ \text{Elt} \\
\quad \text{eq} \quad \text{<_: Elt Elt -> Bool} \quad \text{comm} \\
\quad \text{eq} \quad \text{<=: Elt Elt -> Bool} \quad \{\text{comm}\} \\
\}
\]

The visible sort \texttt{Elt} corresponds to \( W \) and the operator \texttt{<_} corresponds to \(<\). The formal parameter of \texttt{INDOFLTO} is declared as \((D::EQLTRIV)\). The conditional equation denoting the rule is declared in \texttt{INDOFLTO}:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ceq} \quad ((P_1 \land (M = X)) \\
|\mapsto ((P_1 \land (M < X)) \lor Q1)) \\
|\mapsto (P \mapsto Q) \quad \text{true} \\
|\mapsto \text{eval}(P \mapsto P_1) \text{ and eval}(Q1 \mapsto Q).
\end{align*}
\]

\( M \) and \( X \) are CafeOBJ variables of the visible sort \texttt{Elt}.\texttt{D}. When \texttt{INDOFLTO} is instantiated with a module \( M \) that satisfies \texttt{EQLTRIV}, \texttt{Elt}., \texttt{=}, \texttt{and <>} are replaced with the corresponding sort, the corresponding operator and the corresponding operator in \( M \).

In order to reason about \texttt{leads-to} properties from equations denoting deductive rules of \texttt{leads-to} properties, we declare and define in a module \texttt{PROVED} (which imports \texttt{SYSTEM} and \texttt{OTSLOGIC}) operators denoting \texttt{invariant} and \texttt{ensures} properties. Such \texttt{invariant} and \texttt{ensures} properties need to be proved in order to complete proving \texttt{leads-to} properties. It is not quite necessary, however, to finish proving such \texttt{invariant} and \texttt{ensures} properties in order to start proving \texttt{leads-to} properties. Operators denoting such \texttt{invariant} and \texttt{ensures} properties are defined with \texttt{invariant}, \texttt{_ensures}_\texttt{r}, \texttt{_<=}, \texttt{_/} and \texttt{_<=>}, \texttt{_<>} declared in \texttt{OTSLOGIC}. We declare and define in a module \texttt{LTO} (which imports \texttt{PROVED}) operators denoting \texttt{leads-to} properties to prove. Such operators are defined with \texttt{_<}, \texttt{_/}, \texttt{_<}, \texttt{_/} and \texttt{_<=>}, \texttt{_<>} declared in \texttt{OTSLOGIC}.

Let us consider proving \( p \mapsto q \). We suppose that in addition to \( v \) whose type is \( \mathcal{R}_v \), \( p \) and \( q \) have the free variables \( z_1, \ldots, z_m \) whose types are \( D_1, \ldots, D_a \) as we did in the previous subsection. We also use the same abbreviations used in the previous subsection. We declare the operator denoting \( p \mapsto q \) and its defining equation in \texttt{LTO}:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{op} \quad \text{lto} : \quad H \mapsto \text{Bool} \\
\text{eq} \quad \text{lto}(S, \overline{Z}_a) = p(S, \overline{Z}_a) \mapsto q(S, \overline{Z}_a).
\end{align*}
\]

As proof scores of \texttt{ensures} properties, we often need case splitting and lemmas. We suppose that the case is split into \( L \) sub-cases characterized by \( L \) propositions \( \text{case}_1, \ldots \), \( \text{case}_L \) such that \( \text{case}_1 \lor \cdots \lor \text{case}_L \equiv \text{true} \). Then the proof passage of each sub-case \( l \) looks like:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{open} \quad \text{LTO} \\
\text{pr} \quad \text{INDOFLTO}(M) \\
\text{-- arbitrary objects} \\
\text{Declarations of constants if necessary} \\
\text{-- assumptions} \\
\text{Declarations of equations denoting case}_l \\
\text{-- check} \\
\text{red} \quad \text{Lems implies} \quad (\text{Prem} \Rightarrow \text{lto}((\overline{\mathcal{Z}}_a)))). \\
\text{close}
\end{align*}
\]

\text{"pr} \quad \text{INDOFLTO}(M)\text{"} may be omitted. \text{Prem} is a CafeOBJ term whose form is \( P \lor P \lor Q \), where \( P \) is a CafeOBJ term denoting an \texttt{invariant} property, an \texttt{ensures} property or a \texttt{leads-to} property, and so is \( Q \). \text{"Prem ⇒" may be omitted.}

\section{Verification that QLock Satisfies the Lockout Freedom Property}

We describe verification that \( S_{\text{block}} \) satisfies the lockout freedom property, namely that \( (p_c(v) = \text{wt}) \Rightarrow (p_c(v) = \text{cs}) \). The property is denoted by the operator \texttt{lto16}, which is defined in a module \texttt{LTO} as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{eq} \quad \text{lto16}(S, I) \\
|\mapsto ((p_c(S, I) = \text{wt}) \mapsto (p_c(S, I) = \text{cs})).
\end{align*}
\]

where \( S \) and \( I \) are CafeOBJ variables of \texttt{Sys} and \texttt{Pid}. As described in Example 3, the verification needs eight \texttt{invariant} properties (see Appendix B), three \texttt{ensures} properties and four \texttt{leads-to} properties. Three of the eight \texttt{invariant} properties are directly needed for the verification. The remaining five are needed to verify the three \texttt{invariant} properties and the three \texttt{ensures} properties. Moreover, the verification needs two lemmas on natural numbers and 10 lemmas on queues as mentioned in Sect. 3.2.

The three \texttt{invariant} properties and the three \texttt{ensures} properties are denoted by the operators \texttt{inv6}, \texttt{inv7}, \texttt{inv8}, \texttt{ens9}, \texttt{ens10} and \texttt{ens11}, which are defined in a module \texttt{PROVED} (which imports \texttt{QLOCK} and \texttt{OTSLOGIC}) as shown in Fig. 1. The four \texttt{leads-to} properties are denoted by the operators \texttt{lto12}, \texttt{lto13}, \texttt{lto14} and \texttt{lto15}, which are defined in the module \texttt{LTO} (which imports \texttt{PROVED}) as shown in Fig. 2. In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, \( S, I, J, \ldots, N \) are CafeOBJ variables of \texttt{Sys}, \texttt{Pid}, \texttt{Pid} and \texttt{Nat}, respectively. The constants \( s, i, \text{and } n \) of \texttt{Sys}, \texttt{Pid} and \texttt{Nat} are declared in \texttt{LTO}.

The \texttt{leads-to} property denoted by \texttt{lto16} is deduced from the \texttt{invariant} property denoted by \texttt{inv8} and the \texttt{leads-to} property denoted by \texttt{lto17}. The corresponding proof score is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{pr} \quad \text{INDOFLTO}(M) \\
\text{-- arbitrary objects} \\
\text{Declarations of constants if necessary} \\
\text{-- assumptions} \\
\text{Declarations of equations denoting case}_l \\
\text{-- check} \\
\text{red} \quad \text{Lems implies} \quad (\text{Prem} \Rightarrow \text{lto}((\overline{\mathcal{Z}}_a)))). \\
\text{close}
\end{align*}
\]
eq inv6(S,I) = invariant (pc(S,I) = wt => \( pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \)).
eq inv7(S,I) = invariant ((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land \text{where(queue}(S),I) = \emptyset)
=> \( pc(S,I) = wf \land \text{top(queue}(S)) = I \)).
eq inv8(S,I,N) = invariant ((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land \text{where(queue}(S),I) = s(N))
=> \( pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land \text{where(queue}(S),I) = s(N) \land pc(S,\text{top(queue}(S))) = cs \)).
eq ens9(S,I) = (pc(S,I) = wt \land \text{top(queue}(S)) = I) \Rightarrow pc(S,I) = cs \).
eq ens10(S,I,J,N) = ((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land \text{where(queue}(S),I) = s(N) \land 
\text{top(queue}(S)) = J \land pc(S,J) = cs)
\Rightarrow (pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = N)).
eq ens11(S,I,J,N) = (((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = s(N) \land 
\text{top(queue}(S)) = J \land pc(S,J) = wt)
\Rightarrow (pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = s(N) \land pc(S,\text{top(queue}(S))) = cs \)).

Fig. 1 Equations declared in the module PROVED.

eq lto12(S,I,N) = ((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = s(N) \land 
\text{pc}(S,\text{top(queue}(S))) = wt) \Rightarrow (pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = N)).
eq lto13(S,I,N) = ((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = s(N) \land 
\text{pc}(S,\text{top(queue}(S))) = wt \land pc(S,\text{top(queue}(S))) = cs) \Rightarrow (pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = N)).
eq lto14(S,I,N) = ((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S) \land where(queue(S),I) = N) \land \text{where(queue}(S),I) < N) \Rightarrow (pc(S,I) = cs)).
eq lto15(S,I) = ((pc(S,I) = wt \land I \in \text{queue}(S)) \Rightarrow (pc(S,I) = cs)).

Fig. 2 Equations declared in the module LTO.

open LTO
red (inv6(s,i) \land lto15(s,i))
=> lto16(s,i) .
close

CafeOBJ returns true for this proof score.

In the rest of the section, we describe the proof scores of the two leads-to properties denoted by lto14 and lto15, and that of the ensures property denoted by ens11. The proof scores of lto12 and lto13 are written in the same way as that of lto16, and the proof scores of ens9 and ens10 are written in the same way as that of ens11.

5.1 Proof Score of lto14

The leads-to property denoted by lto14 is deduced from the two invariant properties denoted by inv7 and inv8, the ensures property denoted by ens9 and the leads-to property denoted by lto13. The verification also needs the lemma nat-lemma2 on natural numbers. The case is split into four sub-cases. The four sets of equations for the four sub-cases are as follows:

1. \( n = \emptyset \)
2. \( n = s(m), where(queue(s),i) = m, (s(m) = m) = false \)
3. \( n = s(m), where(queue(s),i) = m, s(m) = m \)
4. \( n = s(m), where(queue(s),i) = m) = false \)

where \( m \) is a constant of Nat. The term \( s(m) \) denotes an arbitrary positive natural number. Note that human users are responsible for checking if all cases are covered.

The proof score (which consists of four proof passages) is as follows:

open LTO
eq n = \emptyset .
red (inv7(s,i) \land ens9(s,i))
=> lto14(s,i,n) .
close

open LTO
op m : \rightarrow Nat . eq n = s(m) .
eq where(queue(s),i) = m .
eq s(m) = m = false .
red lto14(s,i,n) .
close

open LTO
op m : \rightarrow Nat . eq n = s(m) .
eq where(queue(s),i) = m . eq s(m) = m .
red nat-lemma2(m) implies lto14(s,i,n) .
close

open LTO
op m : -> Nat . eq n = s(m) .

  eq (where(queue(s),i) = m) = false .
  red (inv8(s,i,m) /\ lto13(s,i,m))
    => lto14(s,i,n) .

close

CafeOBJ returns true for each of the four proof passages.

5.2 Proof Score of lto15

The leads-to property denoted by lto15 is deduced from
the leads-to property denoted by lto14. The proof score is
as follows:

open LTO
pr(INDOFLTO(PNAT)) .
red lto14(s,i,n) => lto15(s,i) .

close

CafeOBJ returns true for this proof score.

5.3 Proof Score of ens11

The two state predicates in the ensures property denoted by
ens11 are denoted by the operators unl11-1 and unl11-2,
which are defined in a module UNL (which imports QLOCK and INV) as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{eq unl11-1}(S, I, J, N) &= (pc(S, I) = wt \text{ and } I \in \text{queue}(S) \text{ and } \\
& \quad \text{where}(queue(S), I) = s(N) \text{ and } \\
& \quad \text{top}(queue(S)) = J \text{ and } pc(S, J) = wt) .
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{eq unl11-2}(S, I, J, N) &= (pc(S, I) = wt \text{ and } I \in \text{queue}(S) \text{ and } \\
& \quad \text{where}(queue(S), I) = s(N) \text{ and } \\
& \quad pc(S, top(queue(S))) = cs) .
\end{align*}

S, I, J and N are CafeOBJ variables of Sys,Pid,Pid and
Nat, respectively. The constants i, j and n of Pid,Pid and
Nat are declared in UNL.

The basic formula to prove in the eventually case is de-
noted by the operator estep11, which is defined in a module
ESTEP (which imports UNL) as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{eq estep11}(I, J, N) &= (\text{unl11-1}(s, I, J, N) \text{ and } \\
& \quad \text{not unl11-2}(s, I, J, N)) \implies \text{unl11-2}(s', I, J, N) .
\end{align*}

The basic formula to prove in the unless case is denoted by
the operator ustep11, which is defined in a module USTEP
(which imports UNL) as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{eq ustep11}(I, J, N) &= (\text{unl11-1}(s, I, J, N) \text{ and } \\
& \quad \text{not unl11-2}(s, I, J, N)) \implies (\text{unl11-1}(s', I, J, N) \text{ or } \\
& \quad \text{unl11-2}(s', I, J, N)) .
\end{align*}

In the eventually case, all needed is to prove that there
exists a witness, namely an instance of a transition, that
makes estep11(i,j,m) true. We conjecture that try\_j is
such a witness, which is confirmed by writing a proof score.
To this end, the case is split into five sub-cases. The five sets
of equations for the five sub-cases are as follows:

1. queue(s) = empty
2. queue(s) = k,q, (k = j) = false
3. queue(s) = k,q, k = j, i = j
4. queue(s) = k,q, k = j, (i = j) = false, 
   (pc(s,j) = wt) = false
5. queue(s) = k,q, k = j, (i = j) = false, 
   pc(s,j) = wt

where k is a constant (of Pid) denoting an arbitrary pro-
cess ID and q is a constant (of Queue) denoting an arbitrary
queue. The term k,q denotes an arbitrary non-empty queue.

The proof scores of the fifth sub-case is shown:

open ESTEP
op k : -> Pid . op q : -> Queue .

  eq queue(s) = k.q . eq k = j .
  eq (i = j) = false . eq pc(s,j) = wt .
  eq s' = try(s,j) .
  red estep11(i,j,n) .

close

CafeOBJ returns true for the proof passage. The proof
scores of the remaining four sub-cases are written likewise.

In the unless case, all we have to do is to prove
step11(i,j,n) for each instance of every transition
(every action operator). We describe the proof that an
arbitrary instance want\_k of the transition want\_k makes
step11(i,j,n) true. For the proof, the case is split into
five sub-cases. The five sets of equations for the five sub-
cases are as follows:

1. pc(s,k) = cs, i = k
2. pc(s,k) = cs, (i = k) = false, 
   queue(s) = empty
3. pc(s,k) = cs, (i = k) = false, 
   queue(s) = l,q, l = k
4. pc(s,k) = cs, (i = k) = false, 
   queue(s) = l,q, (l = k) = false
5. c-exit(s,k) = false

where l is a constant (of Pid) denoting an arbitrary pro-
cess ID and q is a constant (of Queue) denoting an arbitrary
queue. Note that the equation pc(s,k) = cs is equivalent
to the equation c-exit(s,k) = true.

The proof of the fourth sub-case needs an invariant
property wrt S\_lock and those of the remaining sub-cases do
not need any invariant properties and any lemmas on data
types. The invariant property needed for the proof of
the fourth sub-case is denoted by the operator inv2, which
is defined in the module INV as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{eq inv2}(S, I) &= (pc(S, I) = cs \\
& \quad \implies \text{top}(queue(S)) = I) .
\end{align*}

The proof score of the fourth sub-cases is shown:
open USTEP
  op k : -\rightarrow Pid .  op l : -\rightarrow Pid .
  op q : -\rightarrow Queue .
  eq pc(s,k) = cs .  eq (i = k) = false .
  eq queue(s) = l,q .  eq (i = k) = false .
  eq s' = exit(s,k) .
  red inv2(s,k) implies ustep11(i,j,n) .
  close

CafeOBJ returns true for the proof passage.

The proof passages of the remaining four sub-cases are written likewise. The proof passages that arbitrary instances of the remaining transitions want and try make ustep11(i,j,n) true are also written likewise, which need the three lemmas (queue-lemma3, queue-lemma8 and queue-lemma9; see Appendix A) on queues.

6. Related Work

Many methodologies have been proposed to verify that systems and/or programs satisfy liveness as well as safety properties. Among such methodologies are UNITY [11], IOA [21] and TLA [22]. Moreover, many formal tools have been developed, which can be used to formalize (or mechanize) such methodologies. Among such tools are CafeOBJ [6], Larch [23]. Isabelle [24], Coq [25] and HOL [26]. IOA has been formalized in Larch [27], TLA has been formalized in Larch and HOL [28],[29], and UNITY has been formalized in Isabelle, Coq and HOL [12]–[14]. The OTS/CafeOBJ method has been largely influenced by UNITY and may be regarded as a method of supporting formal verification of UNITY programs modeled as OTSs. Therefore, we summarize one approach to formalizing UNITY.

Paulson[12] proposes a way to formalize (or mechanize) UNITY in Isabelle [24], which is a proof assistant based on higher-order logic. The UNITY he uses is new UNITY [30],[31], while the UNITY that affects the OTS/CafeOBJ method is classic UNITY [11]. The most primitive property (or temporal operator) is unless in classic UNITY, while it is co (or next) in new UNITY. Given two state predicates p and q, p co q is defined as follows: whenever p holds in a state of a UNITY program, every statement of the program makes q hold in the successor state. unless can be defined in terms of co, namely (p \land \neg q) co (p \lor q), which is equal to p unless q. Paulson formalizes the six basic properties (co, stable, invariant, transient, ensures and leads-to) in Isabelle and reason about theorems on safety and liveness properties with Isabelle. Given a state predicate p, transient p is defined as follows: whenever p holds in a state of a UNITY program, there exists a statement of the program that makes p false in the successor state. He also defines the weak version of the six basic properties so that the basic properties satisfy the substitution axiom [32]. The weak version takes into account reachable states of programs. The definition of the five basic properties in this paper correspond to the weak version.

Recently much attention has been paid to model checking [33] because it can verify fully automatically that systems and/or programs satisfy safety and liveness properties. Many model checkers have been developed. Basically, however, systems that can be model checked should be finite state. On the other hand, interactive theorem proving such as the OTS/CafeOBJ method and Isabelle/UNITY can also be applied to infinite-state systems. Although abstraction methods [34] make a finite-state abstract version of a given (infinite-state) system and make it possible to model check the abstract version with respect to a given property, it is necessary to prove that the abstraction used preserves the property, which usually needs (interactive) theorem proving.

7. Conclusion

We have described a way to verify that designs for systems satisfy liveness properties in the OTS/CafeOBJ method. A mutual exclusion protocol called Qlock has been used as an example, and it has been verified that Qlock satisfies the lockout freedom property, which can be expressed as a leads-to property.

Proof scores of ensures properties are quite similar to ones of invariant properties [3]–[5], and so are ones of unless and stable properties. This means that the verification techniques and tips [3] devised for verification of invariant properties can be used for verification of ensure properties.

In addition to the mutual exclusion protocol, we have applied the proposed verification method to a workflow system that takes into consideration some security policies [35],[36]. We still need to apply the method to a wider variety of applications to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed verification method.

References

Appendix A: Lemmas on Data Types

The lemmas on natural numbers that are needed for the verification of Qlock on the lockout freedom property are as follows:

\[
\text{eq nat-lemma1}(X, Y) = (X = Y \iff s(X) = s(Y)).
\]
\[
\text{eq nat-lemma2}(X) = (X = 0 \iff X = s(X)).
\]

where \(X\) and \(Y\) are CafeOBJ variables of \(\text{Nat}\). The equation is declared in the module \(\text{PNAT}\).

The lemmas on queues that are needed for the verification are as follows:

\[
\text{eq queue-lemma1}(Q, X) = X \in \text{put}(Q, X).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma2}(Q, X) = X \in Q \implies X \in \text{put}(Q, X).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma3}(Q, X, Y) = (X \in \text{put}(Q, Y) \iff X = Y) \land (X \in Q).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma4}(Q, X) = (X \in \text{get}(Q) \implies X \in Q).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma5}(Q, X) = (X \in \text{del}(Q, X) \implies X \in Q).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma6}(Q, X) = (X \in \text{del}(Q, X) \implies X \in Q).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma7}(Q, X) = (X \in \text{del}(Q, X) \implies X \in Q).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma8}(Q, X) = X \in Q \implies (top(Q) = X \iff \text{where}(Q, X) = 0).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma9}(Q, X, Y, N) = X \in Q \implies (\text{aux-where}(Q, X) = N \implies \text{aux-where}(\text{put}(Q, Y), X) = N).
\]
\[
\text{eq queue-lemma10}(Q, X) = X \in Q \implies (\text{where}(Q, X) = \text{aux-where}(Q, X)).
\]

where \(Q, X, Y, N\) are CafeOBJ variables of Queue, Elt.D, Elt.D and Nat, respectively. The equations are declared in the module \(\text{QUEUE}\).
Appendix B: Invariant Properties

The invariant properties wrt $S_{\text{Qlock}}$ that are needed for the verification are as follows:

$$\text{eq inv1}(S, I, J) = (\text{pc}(S, I) = \text{cs} \text{ and } \text{pc}(S, J) = \text{cs} \text{ implies } I = J) .$$

$$\text{eq inv2}(S, I) = (\text{pc}(S, I) = \text{cs} \text{ implies } \text{top(queue}(S))) = I) .$$

$$\text{eq inv3}(S, I) = (I \setminus \text{in queue}(S) \text{ iff } (\text{pc}(S, I) = \text{wt} \text{ or } \text{pc}(S, I) = \text{cs})) .$$

$$\text{eq inv4}(S, I) = (\text{top(queue}(S))) = I \text{ implies not}(I \setminus \text{get(queue}(S)))) .$$

$$\text{eq inv5}(S, I) = \text{not}(I \setminus \text{del(queue}(S), I)) .$$

$$\text{eq inv6}(S, I) = (\text{pc}(S, I) = \text{wt} \text{ implies } \text{pc}(S, I) = \text{wt} \text{ and } I \setminus \text{queue}(S)) .$$

$$\text{eq inv7}(S, I) = (\text{pc}(S, I) = \text{wt} \text{ and } I \setminus \text{queue}(S) \text{ and where(queue}(S), I) = 0 \text{ implies } \text{pc}(S, I) = \text{wt} \text{ and } \text{top(queue}(S))) = I) .$$

$$\text{eq inv8}(S, I, N) = (\text{pc}(S, I) = \text{wt} \text{ and } I \setminus \text{queue}(S) \text{ and where(queue}(S), I) = s(N) \text{ implies } \text{pc}(S, I) = \text{wt} \text{ and } I \setminus \text{queue}(S) \text{ and where(queue}(S), I) = s(N) \text{ and } (\text{pc}(S, \text{top(queue}(S))) = \text{wt} \text{ or } \text{pc}(S, \text{top(queue}(S))) = \text{cs})) .$$

where $S, I, J$ and $N$ are CafeOBJ variables of Sys, Pid, Pid, Nat, respectively. The equations are declared in the module INV.

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