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このアイテムの引用には次の識別子を使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/10119/3866

タイトル: Simple Decision Heuristics in Perfect Information Games
著者: Konno, Naoki
Kijima, Kyoichi
キーワード: bounded rationality
simple decision heuristics
game theory
perfect information game
expected utility
発行日: Nov-2005
出版者: JAIST Press
抄録: In the real world, players generally recognize the possibility of misperception in their own internal decision model. Therefore, decision makers sometimes adopt some kinds of simple decision heuristics even when they play a game of perfect information. To describe such situations, we first propose a rough reasoning model and show the difference by applying it to the centipede games. Then we propose 4 kinds of simple decision heuristics in order to describe more irrational decision making situations, where the players adopt rational / optimistic/ pessimistic / risk neutral decision heuristics. We, then, investigate that effectiveness of each decision heuristics by applying them to the constant-sum games and centipede game. We first show that rational decision heuristics is powerful in the constant-sum situations. However, optimistic societies that consist of optimistic player achieve more desirable social welfare than rational societies in the centipede game situations.
記述: The original publication is available at JAIST Press http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/jaist-press/index.html
IFSR 2005 : Proceedings of the First World Congress of the International Federation for Systems Research : The New Roles of Systems Sciences For a Knowledge-based Society : Nov. 14-17, 2076, Kobe, Japan
Symposium 2, Session 3 : Creation of Agent-Based Social Systems Sciences Formal Systems
言語: ENG
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10119/3866
ISBN: 4-903092-02-X
出現コレクション:IFSR 2005

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