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https://hdl.handle.net/10119/4440
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| Title: | Efficient Countermeasures against RPA, DPA, and SPA |
| Authors: | Mamiya, Hideyo
Miyaji, Atsuko
Morimoto, Hiroaki |
| Keywords: | Elliptic curve exponentiation
ZPA
RPA
DPA
SPA |
| Issue Date: | 2004 |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| Magazine name: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Volume: | 3156/2004 |
| Start page: | 343 |
| End page: | 356 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/b99451 |
| Abstract: | In the execution on a smart card, side channel attacks such as simple power analysis (SPA) and the differential power analysis (DPA) have become serious threat [15]. Side channel attacks monitor power consumption and even exploit the leakage information related to power consumption to reveal bits of a secret key d although d is hidden inside a smart card. Almost public key cryptosystems including RSA, DLP-based cryptosystems, and elliptic curve cryptosystems execute an exponentiation algorithm with a secret-key exponent, and they thus suffer from both SPA and DPA. Recently, in the case of elliptic curve cryptosystems, DPA is improved to the Refined Power Analysis (RPA), which exploits a special point with a zero value and reveals a secret key [10]. RPA is further generalized to Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) [2]. Both RPA and ZPA utilizes a special feature of elliptic curves that happens to have a special point or a register used in addition and doubling formulae with a zero value and that the power consumption of 0 is distinguishable from that of an non-zero element. To make the matters worse, some previous efficient countermeasures are neither resistant against RPA nor ZPA. Although a countermeasure to RPA is proposed, this is not universal countermeasure, gives each different method to each type of elliptic curves, and is still vulnerable against ZPA [30]. The possible countermeasures are ES [3] and the improved version [4]. This paper focuses on countermeasures against RPA, ZPA, DPA and SPA. We show a novel countermeasure resistant against RPA, ZPA, SPA and DPA without any pre-computed table. We also generalize the countermeasure to present more efficient algorithm with a pre-computed table. |
| Rights: | This is the author-created version of Springer, Hideyo Mamiya, Atsuko Miyaji, Hiroaki Morimoto, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 3156/2004, 2004, 343-356.The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com, http://www.springerlink.com/content/3dye50rdpd3tmrde |
| URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/10119/4440 |
| Material Type: | author |
| Appears in Collections: | b10-1. 雑誌掲載論文 (Journal Articles)
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