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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10119/4449

Title: A Second-price Sealed-bid Auction with the Discriminant of the p_<0>-th Root
Authors: Omote, Kazumasa
Miyaji, Atsuko
Keywords: Proof of knowledge
Public verifiability
Economics
Issue Date: 2003
Publisher: Springer
Magazine name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume: 2357/2003
Start page: 57
End page: 71
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-36504-4
Abstract: A second-price sealed-bid auction is that a bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price. This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction. An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret. We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p_<0>-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results, and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one.
Rights: This is the author-created version of Springer, Kazumasa Omote, Atsuko Miyaji, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2357/2003, 2003, 57-71.The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com, http://www.springerlink.com/content/t417638177358x69
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10119/4449
Material Type: author
Appears in Collections:b10-1. 雑誌掲載論文 (Journal Articles)

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